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With the implementation and continuing research on information systems, such as 
Information Technology for the 21st Century (IT-21), Navy-Marine Corps Intranet 
(NMCI), and “Network-Centric warfare,” there is little doubt that the Navy is becoming 
heavily dependent on information and information systems.   Though much has been 
accomplished technically to protect and defend these systems, an important security issue 
has thus far been overlooked—the human factor. 
Information Assurance Risk Management (IARM) was a proposal to standardize 
the way DON personnel discuss, treat, and implement information assurance.  IARM 
addresses the human security aspect of information and information systems in a 
regimented way to be understandable through all levels of the DON. 
  To standardize the way DON personnel perceive information assurance, they 
must be taught what IARM is and how to use it.  Can an IARM course be implemented in 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
A. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
Information Assurance Risk Management (IARM) has been proposed by LCDR 
Ernest Hernandez as a method to standardize the Department of the Navy (DoN) human 
factors involvement in information assurance (IA) (Hernandez p. 29).  Because 
information assurance is vital to the DoN, as determined by the Chief of Naval 
Operations in Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 5239.1B, the need 
for IA training becomes evident.  If the proposed IARM method will best satisfy the 
CNO’s requisite (See Chapter 2) for IA training, then IARM education and training is a 
requisite.  This thesis accepts both the problem identified and the solution proposed by 
LCDR Hernandez and proceeds from there. 
If IARM training and education is a requisite, then to whom should it be taught?  
The DoN has numerous programs and systems for which IARM would be applicable.  
However, because the applicable programs and systems are many, there exist a copious 
number of personnel to be trained.  Skills, knowledge, rank, and job specialty vary 
greatly among these personnel.  With such immense involvement of a multiplicity of 
DoN personnel, how can IARM be effectively taught to specific personnel? 
The answer lies within the roots of IARM itself.  IARM evolved from the 
Operational Risk Management (ORM), of which former Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) Admiral Jay Johnson said, “ORM applies across the entire spectrum of naval 
activities, from joint operations and fleet exercises to daily routine.  We must encourage 
top down interest in the ORM process, from the flag level all the way down to the deck 
plates.”   To be applicable Navy-wide, IARM, like its ORM cousin from which it was 
1 
derived, must also be “applied across the entire spectrum of naval activities.”  Therefore, 
IARM should also be encouraged and taught from the “flag level all the way down to the 
deck plate.”     
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 1. Primary: 
Can an Information Assurance Risk Management module/course be implemented 
into existing DoN training pipelines to standardize the human factors involvements in 
Information Assurance Navy-wide? 
2. Subsidiary: 
If an IARM module/course can be implemented in the DoN, then it is obligatory 
to address the following questions: 
a. Who would benefit from this course? 
b. At what level(s) should this course be taught? 
 
 
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
IARM was proposed and developed by LCDR Hernandez.  This research does not 
intend to re-define IARM, but to accept LCDR Hernandez conclusions and examine the 
possibilities of implementing IARM training.  Though certain key concepts of IARM are 
readdressed, the reader should become familiar with LCDR Hernandez’s thesis on 
IARM.  (See Bibliography.)   
The primary and subsidiary research questions are not intended to focus 
specifically on the content of an IARM course.  In fact, an IARM course content cannot 
be specifically addressed, until the questions of whether or not there is necessity and a 
2 
requisite for the course, what is the appropriate level for the course, and to whom the 
course should be taught are answered first.  LCDR Hernandez’s work started to address, 
but never fully answered these essential questions (see Appendix B).  Though the 
curricula itself is not the focus of this thesis, IARM course specific information is alluded 
to, in order to fully develop the answers to the preliminary and subsidiary research 
questions.  
Although IARM is useful to the entire DoN, the training of DoN civilian 
personnel is not addressed.  In addition, the DoN is comprised of numerous communities 
and specialties, not all community specific applications of IARM are addressed.  The 
author is most familiar with the Surface Warfare Community (SWO); a majority of the 
examples and applications of IARM and DoN training pipelines are addressed from the 
SWO perspective.  This does not necessarily imply that other DoN communities are not 
addressed in this thesis, and certainly does not preclude IARM from being used or taught 
in other DoN communities.   
Though changes are proposed by this research, these changes are not fundamental 
to existing training pipelines.   
 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATOIN 
Chapter I discusses the purpose and area of research, the research questions to be 
addressed, and the scope and methodology used to conduct the research.  Definitions and 
abbreviations are also listed in Chapter I. 
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Chapter II briefly reviews the IARM concept and discusses why IARM is useful 
to the DoN.  The IARM process is briefly discussed to familiarize the reader with the 
IARM method and illustrate its ease of use. 
Chapter III examines the feasibility of an IARM course/module for the DoN and 
attempts to answer the primary research question.  The subsidiary research questions are 
also addressed in this chapter, specifically as to what level and to whom an IARM course 
should be taught.   
Chapter IV contains a summary of the thesis, conclusions, recommendations, and 
further areas of research are presented. 
Appendix A is the governing Information Assurance instruction for the DoN from 
the Chief of Naval Operations.  It is included as background information for IA, and is 
used to establish the requisite for IARM training. 
Appendix B is an excerpt from LCDR Hernandez IARM thesis, included to fully 
develop the IARM concept and to assist the reader in fully understanding how to use 
IARM process.   
Appendix C is another excerpt from LCDR Hernandez IARM thesis.  A tentative 
IARM curricula and general corresponding levels of instruction were proposed. 
Appendix D is the Operational Risk Management (ORM) instruction from the 
Chief of Naval Operations.  It demonstrates DoN commitment to risk management, and 
illustrates to what degree the DoN should go in adopting IARM. 
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II. WHY INDOCTRINATE INFORMATION ASSURANCE RISK 
MANAGEMENT  
If as one people speaking the same language they have begun to do 
this, then nothing they plan to do will be impossible for them.   
-Genesis 11:6 
A. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
The Department of the Navy’s current approach to IA is governed by the Chief of 
Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 5239.1B, Department of the Navy 
Information Assurance Program.  Table 2-1 outlines the IA objectives stated in 
OPNAVINST 5239.1B.  Derived from this single instruction are a series of Naval 
Publications (5239 series) that break down specific areas of IA even further.  Pub 01 is 
intended to introduce and summarize the DoN’s approach to IA and “…foster a common 
understanding of IA principles, concepts and interrelationships among system planners, 
organizational managers, Information Systems Security Officers and Managers, and 
users” (OPNAVINST 5239.1B).  However, under this instruction, IA is broken down into 
several modules: Information Security (INFOSEC), Operation Security (OPSEC), 
Communications Security (COMSEC), Monitoring, and Vulnerability Assessments 
(CNO N643 p. 1).  Although Pub 01 attempts to foster a “common understanding” and 
lay the groundwork for a layered defense for IA, it necessitates the need for thirty-five 
additional 5239 modules that provide directed guidance for specific areas of IA.  
Although several of these modules still target a general audience (e.g., Network Security 




DoN IA Objectives 
¾ Employ efficient procedures and cost-effective, information-based 
security features on all Information Technology (IT) resources 
procured, developed, operated, maintained, or managed by DoN 
organizational elements to protect the information on those 
resources. 
¾ Protect the confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, and 
non-repudiation of information and resources to the degree 
commensurate with their value, as determined by the required level 
of IA, classification or sensitivity level and the consequences of 
their exploitation or loss for a period required by the mission 
supported. 
¾ Conduct an assessment of threats, identify the appropriate 
combination of safeguards from the IA disciplines, and apply an 
appropriate Certification and Accreditation (C&A) process for 
each specific information system developed by a program office 
and for each local site employing networks and deployed 
information systems. 
¾ Adopt a risk-based life cycle management approach in applying 
basic minimum uniform standards for the protection of DoN 
information technology resources that produce, process, store, or 
transmit information. 
¾ Establish standardized IA training within the DoN. 
 
Table 2-1.   DoN IA Objectives (From: CNO N643 p. 2-3). 
 
The fact that thirty-five modules were needed to address different aspects of IA 
also alludes to another important DoN distinction between “general audiences” (i.e., 
users) and “specific communities” (i.e., those responsible for technical support).  Though 
it is necessary to understand the differences amongst users and technical supporters 
involved in IA, it does little for the standardization of training to compartmentalize 
requisite IA knowledge into two seemingly disconnected groups and thirty-five 
publications.   
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The IA Pub 5239 modules are intended to provide a common understanding of IA 
principles, concepts, and interrelationships based on the DoN IA objectives.  Through 
this “common understanding,” it was envisioned that the modules could then be used to 
assist in planning and securely operating information systems and to help system users 
maintain security awareness.  However, with so many modules and only certain modules 
applying to certain people, how does the DoN achieve a “common understanding” of IA 
as a whole?   
One of the major challenges faced by the DoN IA program is how to change its 
stand-alone security systems to an integrated, or “defense-in-depth,” security strategy that 
supports an overall IA doctrine.  The DoN recognizes that part of the doctrine must “…be 
accomplished through the employment of defensive layers that include the IA 
disciplines” (CNO N643 p. 5).  This appears to be a good start, but herein also lies the 
largest problem—“IA disciplines”.  Currently splintered organizations focus on 
individual IA disciplines that address specific IA objectives.   What the DoN needs, is a 
governing IA doctrine that aligns the numerous fractured IA organizations into a common 
IA goal that truly provides a “defense-in-depth” security strategy.        
1. Space and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR) Systems Command  
The commander of SPAWAR (COMSPAWARSYSCOM) is designated by 
OPNAVINST 5239.1B as DoN IA program manager (PMW-161).  As IA program 
manager, COMSPAWARSYSCOM is responsible for drafting and maintaining a master 
plan for the Navy consisting of “…identification and formal documentation of IA goals 
and objectives for the Navy, a strategy for achieving those goals and objectives, a 
description of IA programs, projects and initiatives that will result in the capabilities 
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needed, and an IA risk management plan” (OPNAVINST 5239.1B).  Specifically, PMW-
161 is “…dedicated to protection of United States Navy information systems afloat and 
ashore” (“Mission”) [emphasis added].  Although SPAWAR is tasked with overall 
management of the Navy’s IA program through PMW-161, it is clear to see from its 
tasking that SPAWAR’s direct involvement is more of a technical nature (i.e., unlike the 
NNOC, SPAWAR is not involved with people or personnel management). 
SPAWAR’s self-describing mission is to “…provide the warfighter with 
knowledge superiority by developing, delivering, and maintaining effective, capable and 
integrated command, control, communications, computer, intelligence and surveillance 
systems,” and to “…provide information technology and space systems for today's Navy 
and Defense Department activities while planning and designing for the future“ 
(“Mission”) [emphasis added].  SPAWAR’s technical focus is still in accordance with 
OPNAVINST 5239.1B, which also designates SPAWAR as the technical lead for IA and 
tasks it with providing “…systems and security engineering and integration testing and 
support for Navy information systems and networks with IA requirements.” Furthermore 
it is to “…maintain a Navy IA research and development program to ensure maximum 
and smooth transition of new technologies to operating forces, fully integrated for 
maximum cost effectiveness with existing technologies” (OPNAVINST 5239.1B) 
Though tasked as the overall program manager for IA, it is evident that SPAWAR 
is more focused on an IA technology objective than overall security.  Even with a 
technology-based focus, SPAWAR neglects the other IA objectives directly impacted by 
its own technology.   Even with its main focus on technology, there still does not exist an 
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overall IA technology strategy, as SPAWAR is not the only organization concerned with 
IA.      
Within SPAWAR, PMW-165 is the program manager responsible for the 
technical aspect of “afloat computer networks” (“PMW-165 Home Page”).  Its assigned 
mission is to provide “the implementation of an integrated, interoperable network 
infrastructure, basic network and information distribution services, and full Information 
Technology afloat,” which it accomplishes by supplying “technical, engineering, 
planning, design, installation and life cycle support of afloat Local Area Networks 
(LANs), Basic Network and Information Distribution Services (BNIDS), and hardware 
and software required for full User IT support” (“PMW-165 Home Page”). 
Although PMW-165 is directly tasked with afloat-networks technology, and 
therefore indirectly with afloat-IA, there are still numerous afloat-IA-technology 
crossovers that do not fall under PMW-165’s (or any other SPAWAR programs) 
purview.  On a single ship, for example, there may exist network components installed 
under the ship’s own prerogative, installed by another organization (e.g., NAVSEA) or, 
in the case of amphibious ships, installed by embarked Marine Corps personnel.  
(Consequently, while Marine Corps networks must be interoperable with their Navy 
counterparts, Marine Corps IA does not fall under the guidance of OPNAVINST 
5239.1B.)  Most importantly, most IA issues are end-to-end, meaning that a portion of the 
infrastructure is ashore.  Even though PMW-165 shares responsibility for afloat-network 
technology, the ship itself is a node in a much larger network (other ships and shore-
based installations), which fall under the purview of PMW-161 and other programs such 
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as Information Technology for the 21st Century (IT-21), Navy-Marine Corps Intranet 
(NMCI), which again, are not necessarily directly accountable to SPAWAR.  
2. Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC) and Network Operation 
Centers (NOC) 
The Fleet Information Warfare Center and the Naval Computer Incident Response 
Team (NAVCIRT), which it manages, are tasked with computer network defense, which 
also entails IA security.  Tasked by OPNAVINST 5239.1B, FIWC provides 
“…assistance [in coordination with PMW-161] in identifying, assessing, containing, and 
countering incidents that threaten Navy information systems and networks.”  FIWC and 
NAVCIRT offer anti-virus scanners, computer security toolboxes (designed by 
SPAWAR), guidance for system configuration changes (made on systems designed and 
installed by SPAWAR), and provide security information to DoN activities via computer 
security advisories that “contain current vulnerability announcements on various 
systems…” (“Mission, Vision And Guiding Principles”).  In addition to their focus on the 
DoN system-security objective, FIWC and NAVCIRT also accomplish the certification 
and accreditation (C&A) objective for afloat-networks.   
Another organization that partially addresses the system-security objective, as 
well as portions of the information-security objective, is the Network Operation Center 
(NOC).  Though not directly tasked by OPNAVINST 5239.1B to provide IA, Fleet NOCs 
are able to do so by acting as a gateway for the ship-shore and shore-ship interface for 
Navy networks.  This single point interface allows the NOC to perform basic IA services 
including firewall protection, intrusion detection, and virus scanning of e-mail 
attachments for ships at sea (“Information Technology Presentation for the 21st 
Century”).  
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 3. Afloat Networks 
Although other organizations share varying degrees of IA responsibilities, and 
attempt to meet different IA objectives, the individual CO is ultimately responsible for all 
aspects of information and information systems in a single command.  According to 
OPNAVINST 5239.1B, “…the commanding officer (CO), commander, or officer-in-
charge (OIC) are [sic] responsible for overall management of IA at the command level.”  
Although the commander retains responsibility, he is directed to appoint an Information 
Systems Security Manager (ISSM) or Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) to 
assist in management and administration for the organization.  In addition to being 
responsible for the ship’s IA, it is also important to note that the CO is also given the 
responsibility to “…make sure standard IA operating procedures are available and used,” 
“…IA awareness indoctrination training and indoctrination is performed,” and “…all 
personnel performing IA functions receive initial basic and system specific training” 
(OPNAVINST 5239.1B). 
In the end, it is the CO and the ISSM who are responsible for incorporating all 
aspects of the IA policy.  Though numerous organizations like SPAWAR, FIWC, 
NAVCIRT, and the Fleet NOCs provide assistance in different IA objectives, no one 
entity, other than the CO, integrates all of the IA objectives.  It is also important to note 
that while the individual organizations are IA “technical supporters,” and probably the IA 
experts, the sole embodiment of the IA policy is little more than a responsible IA “user.”    
4. A Confused Organization 
The DoN understands the importance of IA but, by simply examining parts of the 




Figure 2-1.  DoN IA Organization Chart. 
 
indirectly involved with IA, the sought after “defense-in-depth” strategy appears to be 
little more than defense (of objectives) by compartmentalization.  It is also apparent that 
considerable gaps and significant overlaps abound in the current IA program.  Though 
repetitiveness and fragmentation will continue to proliferate throughout the IA policy, the 
DoN could greatly enhance its IA efficiency, and sum up its IA objectives into an overall 
strategy, by simply adopting a common but robust IA management tool that synchronizes 
the entire DoN IA organization. 
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B. INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION ASSURANCE RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
LCDR Ernest Hernandez developed IARM as a Masters level thesis at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  Like its cousin ORM, from which it was derived, IARM applies 
common principles and syntax to IA, facilitating greater standardization and a more 
vigorous defense.  In addition, ORM has been credited with “dramatic results” since its 
inception into the DoN (OPNAVINST 3500.39A), which suggest that the adoption of 
IARM could also provide a similar outcome (Hernandez p. 61).  
IARM is intended to be a simple yet hearty language that allows each person 
familiar with IARM to speak about IA in a common syntax.  While there are still, and 
will continue to be, overlaps and gaps in the numerous DoN organizations that deal with 
IA, IARM would greatly enhance the inter-workings of these organizations with each 
other and the warfighters in the fleet.  Through the employment of IARM, those involved 
with IA would finally be able to clearly understand each other (Hernandez p. 50).    
     
C. PRINCIPLES 
IARM is based on four principles that must be present throughout all aspects of 
the IARM process.  These principles facilitate constructing and managing an effective 
risk management plan.    
1. Accept No Unnecessary Risk 
Risk assessment is a process of understanding how the corruption, loss, or theft of 
information resources will affect one’s critical infrastructures.  Risk assessment is not an 
exact science, and consequently it is a very difficult task (Denning 386).  New 
vulnerabilities and exploits are constantly being discovered, and it is almost impossible to 
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determine the likelihood of attack on one’s systems.  Information values are also 
somewhat ambiguous, but can at least be placed in the categories of replacement costs, 
unavailability costs, and disclosure costs (Denning 387).  Overall, risk is inherent to 
information systems as it is almost impossible to predict every vulnerability and 
consequence. 
Although risk assessment is difficult, risk management is a deliberate process of 
identifying and understanding likely risks and subsequently deciding upon and 
implementing actions to reduce risk to a defined level.  It is here in the risk management 
phase that the first principle must constantly be applied.  If a risk or new vulnerability is 
identified, then an appropriate countermeasure must be installed.  If new hardware is 
installed, it must comply with current security measures.  Even if all risks/vulnerabilities 
cannot be discovered and addressed, accepting no unnecessary risks in mission critical 
requirements can certainly mitigate them. 
2. Make Risk Decisions at the Appropriate Level 
Making risk decisions at the appropriate level is the second and perhaps the most 
important principle of IARM.  LCDR Hernandez suggests, “the appropriate level for risk 
decision is the one that can allocate the resources to reduce the risk or eliminate the threat 
and implement controls” (48).   This statement appears to be a generality of leadership, as 
the leader is solely responsible for the assigned information resources. 
Though one leader is ultimately responsible, numerous people are involved in this 
process.  The person who controls allocation of resources may not understand the 
controls needed to reduce the threat, and, conversely, the person who understands the 
threats may be asking for more controls than the available resources permit.  Hence, the 
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leader must be able to mitigate these problems and must, therefore, have an 
understanding of both the available resources and control measures.  It is here that the 
utility of IARM and the necessity of teaching to both the technician and the decision-
maker become most evident.  (Recall the distinction between IA “users” and “technical 
supporters.”) 
3. Accept Risk When Benefits Outweigh the Costs 
The third principle of IARM is also clearly a responsibility of leadership, and the 
IA “user” vice “technical supporter.”  Even if accepting any risk is contrary to the 
IARM’s first principle, a good leader understands the necessity for compromise and 
balance.  Although vulnerabilities may be identified (by a technical supporter), an 
immediate countermeasure implementation may not be necessary if there is little chance 
of the vulnerability actually being exploited (as decided by a user).  However, if a good 
leader does not understand the risks and controls, he is not able to make the necessary 
compromise. Thus, this principle, too, highlights the need for IARM training not only at 
the decision-maker level, but also emphasizes the need for the technician to be able to 
clearly describe the importance of the vulnerability and or countermeasure in terms the 
decision maker can understand.  
4. Anticipate and Manage Risk by Planning 
While not all risks can be identified in the beginning, managing those risks that 
are anticipated is much easier than attempting damage control.  Correctly anticipating 
risks or problems in the planning stage allows for specifically-designed controls to be 
implemented from the start and facilitates maintenance and scalability of future controls 
needed for those unanticipated risks.   
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Not all risks are initially identifiable; however, implemented controls for future 
vulnerabilities must be interoperable with the original plan.  Even if future controls 
address new perceived risks, the hodgepodge of controls may cause additional problems.  
Once a risk management plan is conceived, those risks and possible controls must be 
viewed and implemented in accordance with the plan’s guidance.  
 
D. BENEFITS 
LCDR Hernandez identified numerous benefits of IARM.  From these derived 
benefits, two things become clear: 1) IARM standardizes the IA the process for all 
persons involved, and 2) IARM provides a common syntax for those involved, which 
consequently derives a better way to do business.  In addition to all of the benefits 
identified by LCDR Hernandez, IARM also addresses either directly or indirectly all of 
the objectives set forth by the DoN IA program, as illustrated in Table 2-1.  (Chapter 3 of 
this thesis will assist IARM in addressing the “standardized IA training” DoN IA 
objective.) 
1. Manages Information Assurance Risks 
“[IARM] improves network and information assurance awareness among users, 
IT support personnel, and decision makers” (Hernandez p. 58).  IARM would improve 
network and information assurance awareness among IT support personnel by providing 
a common syntax for them to discuss and address IA issues.  In addition, by being a 
simplistic language able to be understood by all persons even remotely involved, IARM 
allows the user, technician, and decision maker to better understand IA and each other.   
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IARM vs. Traditional Approach 
Systematic  Random, Individual-Dependent 
System View  Point Solutions 
Proactive  Reactive 
Integrates All Types of Threats 
and Vulnerabilities Into Planning 
 Security as After-thought Once 
Computer Network Services are 
Initiated. 
Common Process/Terms of 
Information Assurance 
 Non-standard 
Conscious Decision Based on 
Risk vs. Benefit 
 “Can Do” Regardless of Risk 
 
Table 2-2.  “IARM vs Traditional Approach” (From: Hernandez  p. 51). 
 
By simply understanding the Risk Assessment Code, the Probability of Occurrence, and 
the Severity Category, IARM can help even the least knowledgeable understand the 
situation.   
IARM is an enabler to “adopt a risk-based life cycle management approach in 
applying basic minimum uniform standards for the protection of DoN information 
technology resources that produce, process, store, or transmit information” (CNO N643 
p. 2-3).  This objective is directly answered by the very definition of IARM—“the 
process of dealing with risk to information and data that is inherently associated with 
information operations and information systems, which includes risk assessment, risk 
decision-making, and implementation of effective risk controls” (Hernandez p. 37).  
2. Increases the Level of Information Assurance 
“Discussing issues of security can raise the general level of interest and concern” 
(Hernandez p. 58).  IARM does help IT personnel raise the level of security by 
identifying potential problems and the best controls to implement in correcting them.  
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Because IARM provides a common language that all involved can understand, general 
security levels will increase as one and all become more security-knowledgeable. 
In addition, IARM can “protect the confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
authenticity, and non-repudiation of information and resources to the degree 
commensurate with their value, as determined by the required level of IA, classification 
or sensitivity level and the consequences of their exploitation or loss for a period required 
by the mission supported” (CNO N643 p. 2-3).  As the principles of IARM become more 
commonplace, classifications, sensitivities, and consequences of IA will also increase.  A 
common IA syntax will increase security knowledge, which in turn will raise security 
conscientiousness. 
3. Identifies Information Assurance Assets, Procedures, and Risks 
IARM assists in providing “a comprehensive list of assets and vulnerabilities 
associated with those assets” (Hernandez p. 58).  By using the IARM principles, potential 
vulnerabilities and controls can be easily identified. However, more than just cataloging 
assets, the list itself becomes part of the IARM plan.  Proper documentation of these 
vulnerabilities and controls can assist not only in identifying current assets, but also in 
illuminating the need for interoperability issues of future assets.   
Using IARM principles, one can easily “conduct an assessment of threats, identify 
the appropriate combination of safeguards from the IA disciplines, and apply an 
appropriate Certification and Accreditation (C&A) process for each specific information 
system developed by a program office and for each local site employing networks and 
deployed information systems” (CNO N643 p. 2-3).  IARM by its very definition is risk 
management for IA.  The employment of IARM and its principles will not only assess 
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threats and identify safeguards, but will also improve the C&A process by allowing all 
persons involved with IA to finally speak with a common understanding.  
4. Provides Cost-effectiveness and Efficiency  
“Decision makers now have an improved basis for implementing controls, 
justifying expensive or inconvenient controls, and continuing the search for more 
effective controls should the need arise” (Hernandez p. 58).  It is often difficult to justify 
expensive controls.  IARM alleviates this problem by allowing the technician, who 
identifies the vulnerability and understands the needed control, to communicate 
effectively with the decision maker, who ultimately holds the “purse strings.”  Allowing 
these two entities the ability to communicate will not only facilitate the decision maker’s 
ability to make a better decision, but will also guide the technician’s efforts and 
understanding of the larger issues. 
IARM facilitates the employment of “…efficient procedures and cost-effective, 
information-based security features on all Information Technology (IT) resources 
procured, developed, operated, maintained, or managed by DoN organizational elements 
to protect the information on those resources” (CNO N643 p. 2-3).  With the proper 
understanding and documentation of IA assets via IARM as previously discussed, more 
efficient and cost-effective IA procedures can be derived.  In addition, although these 
plans and procedures may vary based on different organizational assets and requirements, 
IARM facilitates a common understanding of IA necessities and interpretabilities DoN-
wide, thereby increasing efficiency, lowering costs, and improving security.  
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5. Standardizes Information Assurance Training 
“Finally, IARM is a continuous, non-static process that can be applied by users, 
IT support personnel, and decision makers alike, giving the whole chain of command the 
opportunity to personally make a positive contribution…” (Hernandez p. 58).  This 
perhaps is the greatest benefit IARM has to offer.  From the decision maker to the 
technician, IARM allows the entire chain of command to communicate and contribute to 
IA. 
By being a standardized process itself, IARM will both necessitate and facilitate 
the establishment of “… standardized IA training within the DoN” (CNO N643 p. 2-3).  
Not only will IARM permit the entire chain of command the ability to contribute to IA, 
but standardized IARM training Navy-wide allows the entire DoN to contribute and raise 
the level of IA.  It is this objective that facilitates the necessity for this thesis and follow-
on work in designing DoN IARM training. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
The current DoN IA policy and organizational structure is confusing and riddled 
with numerous gaps and overlaps.  Realizing the Navy’s IA problem, LCDR Hernandez 
developed IARM as an answer to the lack of an overall IA strategy.  By adopting the 
simple principles of IARM, the Navy can not only improve upon its traditional method of 
dealing with IA, but also greatly improve it.  The simplicity and numerous benefits of 








A. DEVELOPING A COURSE—TRAINING PROJECT PLAN (TPP) 
The Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) is responsible for the training 
of all Navy personnel.  CNET Instruction (CNETINST) 1550.10B provides policy and 
defines the responsibilities for “the production, approval, implementation and 
cancellation of training programs and materials.”  It also provides policy for the 
production of training material using two approved CNET instructional systems 
design/development (ISD) methods—Naval Education and Training (NAVEDTRA) 
manual 130 and NAVEDTRA 131.  (ISD is a systematic design for training that focuses 
on specific objectives.)   
NAVEDTRA 130 is a “task-based” curriculum management manual that focuses 
on a specific job to be accomplished by the student after the training is complete.  By 
focusing on the job and the skills or tasks necessary to perform the job, a task-tailored 
curriculum can be developed.  In contrast, NAVEDTRA 131 is a “personnel performance 
profile (PPP) –based” manual that focuses on background knowledge, the performance of 
tasks/functions, and the operations and maintenance of hardware 
(equipment/subsystems/systems). By careful analysis of the factors involved, this method 
produces a performance outline on which to base the curriculum. 
To determine which of these methods and manuals is best suited for the 
development of IARM training, the goal of IARM training must be determined.  IARM is 
designed to be an aid in managing IA risks and to be a common syntax for all of those 
involved with IA.  Though IARM certainly has the ability to aid in different jobs, simply 
“performing” IARM will not accomplish any specific tasks—ruling out the task-based 
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method.  Undoubtedly, the goal of IARM training is to impart the background knowledge 
of applying the IARM principles to numerous tasks, which clearly falls under the PPP 
method.    By learning IARM and its principles, the student is able to apply IARM in 
whatever manner necessitated by the student in any particular situation. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the entire course development process for the PPP process.  
Although it is necessary to complete all of these stages to fully develop and implement a 
new course as set forth by the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC), all 
stages are not necessary to justify initial course development.   
The “planning stage” will be the main focus of this section, as it contains the 
“Training Project Plan” (TPP), which contains requisite information for course 
development.  However, like the PPP process as a whole, some of the requirements for 
developing a TPP are necessary strictly for NETC administrative purposes.  Though these 
requirements—establishing a Course Identification Number (CIN), Course Data 
Processing Code (CDP), initiating entries for the Catalog of Navy Training courses 
(CANTRAC) and the Navy Integrated Resources and Administration System 
(NITRAS)—are necessary for a complete TPP, they do not impact the scope of course 
development for this thesis (NAVEDTRA p. 2-1-1).  By simply examining portions of 
the TPP, enough material becomes apparent for further development of an IARM course. 
The TPP contains basic preliminary information about the course including the 
intent and scope of the curriculum, as well as the Fleet-need, which generated the initial 
requirement for the curriculum.  When finally approved, the TPP becomes the 
authorization to undertake the development of a new course.  (CNET approves TPPs for 
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 Figure 3-1.  Curriculum Development Process (From: NAVEDTRA 131A p.1-5). 
 
 new courses unless the resource requirement is beyond CNET, upon which CNET 
forwards the TPP to the appropriate CNO sponsor (CNETINST p. 4)).          
1. Justification for Course Development 
The first step in developing a TPP is to identify the reason or need for the new 
course.  NAVEDTRA 131A lists several acceptable course justifications: (1) Navy 
Training Plans (NTPs), (2) tasking by higher authority, (3) internal course reviews and 
local command initiatives, (4) external feedback, (5) surveillance, and (6) training 
appraisal (p. 2-2-1).  Justifications for implementing IARM in the DoN were presented in 
LCDR Hernadez’s thesis and Chapter Two of this thesis and are further represented by 
Figures 3.2, which illustrates current DoN Network Operations, and 3.3, which illustrates 
the future of DoN Network Operations.  While a strong case has been 
23 
 Figure 3-2.  Current DoN Network Concerns.  (From: VADM Mayo 
Information Professionals presentation). 
 
made for exploiting IARM, does it meet the established criteria and warrant justification 
for development of an IARM course? 
The necessities for IARM training do in fact meet a number of the NAVEDTRA 
conditions.  The CNO and N643 have both established the need for IA and standardized 
IA training (See Table 2-1), thus establishing tasking from the highest authority in the 
DoN.  In addition, by observing two DoN organizations and the DoN-governing IA 
publication (See Chapter 2), it becomes apparent that a standardized IA syntax is needed 
to integrate all of the current IA organizations and assets, thereby also meeting the 
surveillance criteria as well.  (Although it is not necessary to meet all of the NAVEDTRA 
course-requirement criteria, implementation of a pilot IARM program would not only 
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prove IARM’s usefulness, but also serve to establish and meet additional NAVEDTRA 
criteria (See Chapter 4, Recommendations).) 
2. Impact Statement    
An impact statement is also required to further justify the necessity of the course 
by highlighting the negative impact of not developing it.  Though numerous benefits of 
IARM and their potential impacts on the DoN have already been discussed clearly 
showing the need for IARM, it is difficult to derive a negative impact statement.  
However, as corroborated by Figures 3.3 and 2.1, Network Operations and, consequently, 
IA will continue to permeate all aspects of the DoN; therefore, by not developing an 
IARM course, the DoN is destined to keep performing IA in the same inadequate way it 
currently employs while its network-centric operations continue to expand. 
3. Mission Statement 
The mission statement for an IARM course is dependent on its student population.  
For example, the mission of IARM taught to decision makers and senior personnel may 
be to increase the understanding of IA through IARM in order to be able to make better-
informed IA-related decisions.  For the technical expert, IARM’s mission may be to raise 
IA understanding in order to assist in protecting IA resources, to develop a 
comprehensive IA system, and to facilitate standardized IA communications within the 
DoN.  Because IARM would assist different personnel in a variety of ways, it becomes 
necessary to examine those who need to know and for what purpose before a tailored 
mission statement can be derived. 
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 Figure 3-3.  “The Network After Next”  (From: VADM Mayo Information 
Professionals presentation). 
 
4. Further Requirements 
There are additional requirements for the TPP that will not be discussed.  Like the 
administrative details referenced earlier, the additional requirements are either 
administrative in nature, course specific, or not applicable to this level of course 
development (i.e., “Course Data Page,” “ Resource Requirements,” and “Safety Risks 
and Hazardous Materials Exposure”) (NAVEDTRA p. 2-7-1).  A requirement, impact 
statement, and mission statement are sufficient for the planning stages of an IARM 
course.  In order to progress into Stage 1 and further areas of course development, the 
appropriate level of the course and to whom it should be taught must be answered next.        
 
26 
B. LEVELS OF INSTRUCTION 
It is important to emphasize that a distinction exists between training and 
education.   As previously discussed, the current DoN IA policy demonstrates an 
apparent difference between “users” and “technical supporters.”  In fact IARM, too 
recognizes this dissimilarity, yet through its use of a standardized syntax, significantly 
diminishes the divergence.  However, because the separation does exist, it is important to 
briefly spotlight the related disparity between the two.         
1. Training 
Both IA users and supporters must be given instruction in IARM to understand 
and use it, but the degree of understanding and therefore the level of instruction becomes 
one of the distinguishing arguments between users and supporters.  Webster’s Dictionary 
defines “train” as “…to form by instruction, discipline, or drill” (p. 1252).  In other 
words, the act of training is simply to teach by instruction or repetitive performance 
(“drill”) in order to perform a task.  In the case of IA users, they need only be proficient 
in the syntax of IARM in order to be qualified to perform their IA role.  In contrast, the 
technical supporter shoulders a greater IA burden and needs, therefore, to be an IARM 
expert.       
 2. Education 
On the other hand, Webster’s Dictionary defines “educate” as “…to train by 
formal instruction and supervised practice especially in a skill, trade, or profession” (p. 
367) [emphasis added].   IARM “training” is sufficient for a user to be able to understand 
the basic IARM syntax and to perform his decision-making role, however technical 
supporters need more.  The IA technical supporter, who has a much greater role in IA, 
must understand all aspects of IARM to utilize it to its fullest potential and would 
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consequently benefit more from “formal” training and “supervised” practice.  In addition, 
the technical supporter needs IARM to perform a designated “…skill, trade or 
profession,” which implies a higher degree of IARM knowledge and education vice 
training. 
 3. Semantics 
Though semantically this difference may seem trivial, it greatly impacts the DoN 
organizational structure.  Comprised of officers versus enlisted, managers versus 
specialists, primary versus secondary versus collateral duties, and communities and rates 
versus assigned billets, the DoN rank and job structure only further emphasize the 
distinction between user and technical supporter and between education and training. 
 
C. WHO NEEDS TO KNOW 
Thus far, it has been demonstrated that not only is an IARM course necessary, but 
there is enough basic information to meet NETC criteria for a new course.  But it has also 
been shown that a controversy as to the type and/or level of the education/training for the 
proposed IARM course also exists due to the organizational structure of the Navy.  It is 
then the goal of this section to further examine this controversy and determine exactly 
who needs to know what. 
The Navy has numerous “standards,” such as Naval and Occupational Standards 
(OCCSTD), Naval Enlisted Classification (NEC) descriptions, and Navy Officer Billet 
Classification (NOBC) that list applicable skills and knowledge for Navy personnel. By a 
closer examination of Navy standards, limited here to the complement of a cruiser-size 
ship, a good understanding of requisite IARM knowledge can be derived.  (It is important 
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to note that this is the first step in developing a Personnel Performance Profile (PPP).  
See Figure 3-1.)  
1. Officers 
The Navy Officer Occupational Classification System (NOOCS) is “…the 
method the Navy uses to identify skills, education, training, experience and capabilities 
related to both officer personnel and manpower requirements” (NAVPERS 158391 p. 3).  
The system is comprised of code structures that form the basis for “… officer manpower 
management and officer personnel procurement, training, promotion, distribution, career 
development and mobilization” (p. 3).  The code structure is further broken down into 
four subsystems—Designator/Grade, Subspecialty (SSP), Navy Officer Billet 
Classifications (NOBC), and Additional Qualification Designation (AQD)—which help 
to further specialize and categorize Naval Officers.   
Although the NOOCS is used to classify an officer, an examination of all of the 
classifications of officers in the DoN is not only unnecessary, but also impractical.  For 
example, the “designator” sub-classification can be subdivided yet further into the 
following: unrestricted line officers (URL) (officers of the line who are not restricted in 
the performance of duty), restricted line officers (officers of the line who are restricted in 
the performance of duty by having been further designated for special duties), staff corps 
officers (officers belonging to one of the eight staff corps (e.g., medical, dental, chaplain, 
etc.)), limited duty officers (officers of the line appointed in broad occupational fields 
indicated by their former warrant designator or enlisted rating), chief warrant officers 
(officers of the line appointed to chief warrant officer for the performance of duty in 
technical fields indicated by former enlisted ratings group), and a few others (NAVPERS 
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158391 p. A-2).  Clearly not all of these designators would need the same level of IARM 
training (e.g., Chaplains have less involvement with a LAN whereas IT warrant officers 
have been commissioned because of and are limited to their specialty within the 
Information Technology rating).  But then how is the requisite level of knowledge, or in 
this case IARM training, determined for an individual officer?  
a. The Designator/Grade 
The Designator/Grade structure of the NOOCS consists “…of designators 
and grades that provide a framework for officer career development and promotion” 
(NAVPERS 158391 p. 3). This sub-classification is the primary administrative means for 
“… classifying, identifying and documenting officer manpower resources and 
requirements” on a very large scale.  The “designator” structure identifies, among other 
things, “…primary specialty qualifications” of officer groups as a whole and would 
therefore differentiate, for example, between an Information Professional Officer (1600) 
(see Information Professional) and a Surface Warfare Officer (1110).  Though the 
designator can be used to determine IARM requirements on a very broad scale, as 
previously discussed, it does little to impact individual officer requirements within a 
particular designator.   
The “grade” structure identifies “…occupational levels associated with the 
scale of naval officer paygrade and rank” (NAVPERS 158391 p. 3).  Like “designator,” 
“grade” alone cannot directly determine the IT involvement of a single officer, but does 
factor into the eligibility and determination of the billet the officer can be assigned. 
Billets are primary jobs within a designator determined by rank and 
eligibility.  Within a designator, officers are assigned billets (e.g., engineer, 
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communications officer, deck officer, etc.) in addition to their primary designator duties.  
While billets can show the need for specialized training, they cannot be the sole 
determining factor. 
b.  The Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) 
The NOBC structure functionally identifies “…officer billet requirements 
and officer occupational experience acquired through billet experience or through a 
combination of education and experience”  (NAVPERS 158391 p. C-3).  Although billets 
alone cannot determine required training, the NOBC recognizes the specialty training that 
an officer does get by having filled certain billets.  Perhaps by identifying those NOBCs 
associated with IA, the Navy could implement IARM training at those billet-specific 
schools, as well as the designator school itself.   
c. Sub-specialty Codes 
The Subspecialty (SSP) structure “…identifies postgraduate education (or 
equivalent training and/or experience) in various fields and disciplines” (NAVPERS 
158391 p. 3).  Though the designator is the primary code used to specify the area of 
specialization (or specialty), certain billets within the designator may require additional 
qualifications beyond those indicated by the designator code alone, hence the need for a 
subspecialty code (NAVPERS 158391 p. B-2).  Although subspecialty codes illustrate 
the need for additional qualifications beyond those of just the designator, subspecialty 
codes are grouped by training category, not by designator. 
d.  The Additional Qualification Designation (AQD) 
The AQD structure identifies “…additional qualifications, skills and 
knowledge required the duties and/or functions of a billet beyond those implicit in the 
billet, designator, grade, NOBC, or subspecialty…” (NAVPERS 158391 p. D-1).  The 
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AQD are those qualifications within the designator that ensure junior officers receive the 
proper training and skills required to become a senior officer in the designator.     
e. Illustration of NOOCS In a URL Junior Officer 
As stated previously, by limiting discussion of the requisite for IARM 
training to a small sample group, the results can be applied to the officer classification 
system as a whole.  Within the limits of a ship’s complement, this discussion will focus 
on the URL Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) designator.  The SWO is primarily 
concerned with all aspects of ship handling and tactical employment of the ship with the 
rank structure (Ensign to Admiral) designating levels of responsibility within the 
designator (i.e., Ensigns through Lieutenants are usually focused on ship handling, 
Lieutenants through Commanders are usually focused on tactical employment of the ship, 
Commanders and Captains are concerned with overall responsibility of the ship, and 
Captains and above are concerned with employment and readiness of groups or fleets of 
ships).  Once designated a SWO, an officer progresses through the stages of the 
designator as his rank and experience increase, ultimately producing a well-rounded 
officer with all of the requisite surface warfare knowledge.  Can the NOOCs also aid in 
determining and tracking the requisite for IARM training for a SWO? 
Upon initial designation as a SWO (designator 1110), an officer goes to a 
community-specific school (in this case Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS)) where 
he learns the fundamentals for his designator for his specific rank, regardless of his future 
assigned billet.  During the course of a SWO’s career, he returns to SWOS for each 
different fundamental level (Division Officer/ship handling, Department Head/tactical 
employment, XO, and CO/over-all ship responsibility).  If IARM is designated as a 
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“fundamental” for the SWO designator, does it not make sense then to incorporate IARM 
training at SWOS itself? 
After SWOS, a SWO is assigned to a ship and a certain billet.  For 
example, a SWO assigned to the communications officer (COMMO) billet is a fairly low-
grade officer directly responsible for, among other things, the ship’s LAN. IARM would 
be important to the COMMO in facilitating his billet-specific responsibilities of IA 
technical support for the entire ship.  Therefore, because the COMMO billet has a 
specific need for IARM, IARM could also be taught in those billet-specific schools that 
demonstrate a requirement for IARM. 
 However, the COMMO is directly answerable to a mid-grade officer 
assigned as the operations officer (OPS), who in turn is answerable to the senior officers, 
executive officer (XO), and commanding officer (CO), the lattermost of whom is 
ultimately responsible for the ship and everything on it.  If the COMMO were the only 
officer familiar with IARM because it was only taught to specific billets, he would not be 
able to effectively communicate his IA needs to his chain-of-command (superior IA 
decision makers).  Although members of the chain-of-command may have been a 
COMMO as a junior officer and may have had IARM knowledge, having held a specific 
billet is not necessary to advance within the designator.  Therefore, IARM knowledge is a 
requisite for more than just the COMMO billet, as the ship’s entire chain-of-command 
may become involved in an IA decision regardless of their present or past billets. 
A SWO earns an AQD upon completion of a major milestone (such as 
qualifying as Officer of the Deck) within the designator.  If IARM were deemed to be 
necessary for an entire designator, yet not taught in SWOS, then making an IARM AQD 
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for those officers having had IARM training or obtaining an IARM qualification would 
also aid in ensuring only qualified officers handled IA.  In addition, making an IARM 
AQD a requirement for advancement within the designator would ensure familiarization 
of every level of the chain-of-command with IARM. 
Lastly, requiring officers/billets to have a subspecialty code would also 
ensure those who needed IARM training would have it. Information Systems and 
Operations is a curriculum offered by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) that fulfills 
the requirements for obtaining a computer technology subspecialty code.  This 
interdisciplinary program provides students with the knowledge of information systems 
technology so that the student may gain proficiency in “…information operations, 
economics and management necessary for the critical warfighting-decisions needed in 
Information Age conflicts” (NPS Catalog p. 41).  The simple addition of IARM to this 
curriculum would not only help achieve the curriculum’s goals, but would also be a 
useful tool that the SWO could use upon his return to the Fleet. 
f. Senior Decision Makers 
  Though discussion up to this point has been about Surface Warfare 
Officers in general, it has been more targeted at junior officers.  Can IARM be taught to 
senior-level officers as well?  (See Appendix C. Section E.) 
The Naval Postgraduate School hosts the “Center for Executive 
Education.”  Intended for “senior DoN/DoD [Department of Defense] executives,” its 
mission is to promote better understanding of “emerging strategic and policy issues and 
practices…” (“About the CEE”).   As part of its strategic direction, the CEE intends to 
provide: 1) “…an environment where defense issues may be better defined and 
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understood,” and 2) “…executive education … that furnish the tools and skills necessary 
to add value to senior defense leader” (“About the CEE”) [emphasis added]. 
  Not only would IARM be an applicable addition to this program, but it 
would also greatly enhance two of the courses presently being offered.  “Leading Change 
in the Information Age” focuses on increasing the “…problem solving ability in 
information superiority of senior defense executives in performing their demanding 
leadership roles” (“Other Programs”) [emphasis added].  One of the primary focuses of 
this course is to familiarize the executive with “…the underlying principles of 
technologies and on the ability to analyze and synthesize effective and flexible strategies” 
(“Other Programs”) [emphasis added].  The other course, “Chief Information Officer” is 
designed “…to better prepare military and civilian managers within the Department of 
Defense to manage the complexity of information technologies” (“Other Programs”).  
Not only would the CEE be an effective way to teach IARM to Senior Decision Makers, 
but the CEE would also have to do very few modifications to its existing courses in order 
to incorporate IARM. 
g. Information Professionals  
Though not currently a part of a standard ship’s complement, the new 
Information Professional (IP) community still bears investigation. (See Appendix C. 
Section C.  The IP community did not exist at the time of LCDR Hernandez’s thesis, 
hence the “Information Technology Support Corps” title.)   Brought into being because of 
the realization that more than a technical infrastructure was needed for a Network-centric 
Navy, the IP community is intended be a cadre of operationally-savvy information 
professional officers providing a direct link between the warfighter and the technical 
35 
supporter.  The mission of the IP community is to “…provide expertise in information, 
command and control, and space systems through the planning, acquisition, operation, 
maintenance and security of systems that support Navy operational and business 
processes” (Mayo to NAVADMIN) [emphasis added].   Defined properly, shipboard IT 
infrastructure support assigned to IPs, which includes elements and responsibilities of 
Combat Information Center Officer (CICO), Communications Officer (COMMO), 
Electronic Maintenance Officer (EMO), and Combat Systems Officer (CSO), is based on 
a job to be done rather than a responsibility of a billet.  The IP is intended to come from 
the “traditional” warfare communities (in the scope of this discussion, Surface Warfare) 
and to help the warfighter via his past “operational experience” and competency in 
“…network and computer system technologies,” “…computer and network 
security/information assurance [emphasis added],” “ information management,” and 
“information technology architecture” (Mayo to NAVADMIN).  See Figure 3-3.  The 
establishment of the IP community, and hence the new link between decision maker and 
supporter, will greatly enhance not only the Navy’s network-centric capabilities, but also 
its IA.    
Undoubtedly the IP will prove to be a professional link between the 
decision-makers and technical supporters but is this not also the proposed role of IARM?  
Similar in tasking, IARM is anticipated to be a link through the use of common syntax, 
whereas IPs are intended to provide a link by means of their experience and knowledge.  
However, by combining the experience and knowledge of the IP with the common syntax 
of IARM, the IP has a better way to communicate with both the decision maker and 
technical supporter, thereby fostering a stronger relationship between all three. 
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 Figure 3-4.  “Aligning for the Warfare Domain”  (From: VADM Mayo 
Information Professionals presentation). 
 
Even though IARM would enhance the IP community it is important to 
note that the decision maker/technical supporter ratio in the Fleet is far greater than the 
number of IPs in the community.  However, in lieu of an IP, IARM alone can still bond 
the decision maker and technical supporter as long as they both have knowledge of 
IARM. 
2. Enlisted Personnel 
Like the NOOCS used for Officers, the Navy Enlisted Occupational Classification 
System (NEOCS), consisting of the enlisted rating structure and the Naval Enlisted Code 
(NEC) structure, serves to categorize the enlisted sailor (NAVPERS 18068F p. 1).   The 
enlisted rating structure consists of “…occupational fields (i.e., broad groupings of 
similar occupations), ratings (i.e., occupational specialties) and rates (i.e., a paygrade 
37 
within a rating),” which provide a “…framework for enlisted career development and 
advancement, and is the primary administrative means for classifying and identifying 
enlisted personnel” (p. 1).   
Though the Officer and Enlisted Occupational Systems appear similar and 
perform basically the same function, the Enlisted system is more explicit in its 
categorization.   For example, Occupational Standards (OCCSTDs) “…express the 
Navy's minimum requirements for enlisted occupational skills,” but do so by stating 
exactly “…what enlisted personnel must do in their rate or rating” (NAVPERS 18068F p. 
5).  By plainly cataloging the tasks for each rate and rating, specific knowledge required 
to perform the task may be derived.  (This task-based method of determining required 
knowledge falls under the guidance of NAVEDTRA 130A, providing yet another formal 
way to look at implementing IARM Navy-wide.) 
On the other hand, the Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) structure supplements 
the enlisted rating structure “…by identifying a non-rating-wide 
skill/knowledge/aptitude/qualification that must be documented to identify both people 
and billets for management purposes” (NAVPERS 18068F p. 3).  The enlisted NEC is 
similar to the Officer’s NOBC or subspecialty code in that it is more skill-specific rather 
rate-specific.  Although NECs are skill-specific, they still tend to apply only to those 
ratings that would need that particular skill.  
a. Applicable Rates 
Because the OCCSTDs list specific groupings and tasks assigned each rate 
and rating, it is much easier to specify which enlisted personnel would most benefit from 
IARM training.  In addition, the NEC structure also narrows down specific rates 
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associated with specific skills.  Utilizing these two main categories, it is fairly easy to 
indicate which enlisted rates would most benefit from IARM. 
To determine which rates would best benefit from IARM, skills are 
examined first.  Defense grouping NECs “…identify individuals in paygrades E1-E3 that 
have received training, are in training, or have an aptitude for training in one of the 
general Occupational Areas” (NAVPERS 18068F p. 3).  Under this category, two 
occupational areas might seem to deal with IA related issues: DG-9710 Electronic 
Equipment Repairman and DG-9720 Communications and Intelligence Specialist.  
(Though some may argue that other categories are applicable, these categories were 
chosen based on the fact that they were the only ones that dealt specifically with 
“Communications” and “Electronics.”)   These areas contain the following rates: 
ST (Sonar Technician) 
TM (Torpedoman’s Mate) 
FT (Fire Control Technician) 
MT (Missile Technicians) 
ET (Electronics Technician) 
AT (Aviation Electronics Technician) 
CTM (Cryptologic Technician (Maintenance)) 
FC (Fire Controlman) 
OS (Operation Specialist) 
SM (Signalman) 
IT (Information Technician) 
IS (Information Specialist) 
AC (Naval Aircrewman) 
AW (Aviation Warfare Systems Operators) 
EW (Electronics Warfare Technician) 
CTI (Cryptologic Technician (Interpretive)) 
CTO (Cryptologic Technician (Communications) 
CTR (Cryptologic Technician (Collection) 
CTT (Cryptologic Technician (Technical)) (NAVPERS 18068F p. 3). 
After having narrowed down the Defense Grouping NECs, the Rating and 
Special Series are examined next.  Rating NECs are applicable for a limited number of 
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ratings, whereas Special NECs apply to groups of ratings.  However, these NECs are 
grouped by ratings themselves so to taper the focus only those ratings that were listed 
under the Defense Grouping NECs and are part of a standard ship’s complement, are 
examined (ST, TM, FT, MT, ET, CTM, FC, OS, SM, IT, IS, EW, CTI, CTO, CTR, 
CTT).  To narrow the criteria even more, the Occupational Fields and their associated 
ratings can be used.  
Occupational fields are a part of the NEOCS system and are broad 
groupings of similar occupations used to “…organize the analysis, management, and 
administration of Navy ratings” (NAVPERS 18068F p. 2).  By applying the Occupational 
Field categories with the ratings previously identified, broad occupations are derived.  
For example, the rates previously identified (ST, TM, FT, MT, ET, CTM, FC, OS, SM, 
IT, IS, EW, CTI, CTO, CTR, CTT) break down into occupational groupings of: 
“General Seamanship” (SM, BM (Boatswain Mate) 
“Ship Operations” (OS, QM (Quartermaster) 
“Weapons Control” (ET (Electronics Technicain), FT, FC) 
“Ordnance Systems” (GM (Gunner’s Mate), MN (Mineman), MT, TM) 
“Sensor Operations” (EW, SGG, STS (Sonar Tecnician (Submarine)) 
“Cryptology” (CTA, CTI, CTM, CTO, CTR, CTT) 
“Communications” (IT), and  
“Intelligence” (IS) (NAVPERS 18068F p. B-1).  
Examining NECs and their applicable rates, and then cross-referencing 
those rates with occupational fields gives the following: 1) numerous ratings are involved 
with IA related areas, 2) these ratings fall under many different Occupational fields, 
which seem to have little to do with IA, 3) as more and more systems become net-reliant, 
additional Occupational fields, and hence additional ratings are going to need to learn 
IARM.  Although the NECs, occupational fields, and rates themselves can be used to 
determine which enlisted personnel require IARM, they cannot be the solely relied upon 
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(e.g., ITs and CTs are both concerned with IARM for IT infrastructure support, vice OSs 
which are more concerned with IARM as users).  Like the officer community, enlisted 
billets and positions must also be examined to more thoroughly narrow the requisite for 
IARM training.   
b. Applicable Billets/Positions 
Having determined the ratings that would most benefit from IARM 
training, it is now important to look at specific enlisted billets/positions that would also 
benefit.  Similar to the officer community in that a certain designator or skill is required 
to fill a certain billet, the enlisted community also has similar standards.   
The Catalog of Navy Training Courses (CANTRAC) maintained by 
CNET, lists all DoN schools and their equivalent qualifications.  In order to fill some 
billets, or ratings for that matter, certain schools are required.  (The CANTRAC lists not 
only rating specific A and C schools, but also NEC schools.)  For example, by 
performing a simple search of the CANTRAC for “information assurance,” the following 
two courses were returned—Information Systems Administrator and Cryptologic 
Technician O Class A. 
Information Systems Administrator is an enlisted NEC school that 
prepares “…technical personnel to administer a networked system with focus on the 
following functional areas: 1) Configuration Management: Manage changes, additions, 
and deletions to network system configurations; 2) System Management: Administration 
of network services, maintaining user accounts, access rights, and directory services; 3) 
Performance Management: Maintain system reliability statistics, performance checking 
of system communications pathways, and optimization of system and application 
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performance” (“CANTRAC”).  Prerequisites are paygrades E4-E5 and rates of CTA, 
CTM, CTO, CTR, CTT, ETS, FT, IT, or STS.  In addition, “…candidates must have 
completed one tour of duty working in the Information Systems environment and have a 
basic understanding of computers, information assurance (security), operating software, 
applications and computer internals” (“CANTRAC”).   
Cryptologic Technician O Class A is an enlisted A school whose 
graduates “… possess the necessary skills in entry level networking, information 
assurance, and cryptologic communications equipment and systems to perform, with 
supervision, the duties of a communications operator at his initial field assignment” 
(“CANTRAC”).  Because this is an A school, requirements are different than that of an 
NEC school and entail a certain ASVAB score, completion of the 10th grade or higher, 
possession of a SECRET security clearance, and be a SN (Seaman) or CTO. 
The CANTRAC is useful in identifying any matching schools and their 
associated degrees, which are necessary to fill specific billets and positions.  The 
CANTRAC is also useful in identifying which rates would benefit from IARM training 
by listing all applicable ratings for specific schools.  (Note that the ratings identified by 
the “Systems Administrator” NEC in the CANTRAC fall within the group already 
identified in the NAVPERS 18068-67B.)  Although the CANTRAC can be very useful in 
identifying requirements and schools for ratings, NECs, and specific job and billets, the 
EDVR actually lists the jobs and billets that enlisted personnel fill. 
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 Figure 3-5.  Sample EDVR (From: Surface Warfare Officer Schools Command). 
 
The Enlisted Distribution and Verification Report (EDVR) is a personnel 
management tool prepared monthly by the Enlisted Personnel Management Center 
(EPMAC).   The EDVR facilitates making manning and assignment decisions by 
providing a detailed description of the personnel, billets, jobs and NECs required for a 
specific command.  (The equivalent document for officers is the Officer Distribution 
Control Report (ODCR)).  The same billeting data can then be used to illustrate training 
shortfalls and provide a common reference for communicating manning status between 
an activity and its Manning Control Authority (MCA) (“4-2 CG Resource 
Management.doc”).  
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The EDVR is broken down into numerous sections that provide different 
statistical views of a command’s manning.  Sections 4 and 5 contain a statistical 
summary called the Navy Manning Plan (NMP) that designates the ship’s “fair share” of 
current personnel assets available in the Navy (Surface Warfare Officer Schools 
Command).  By using the EDVR and the NMP to determine a command’s manning, 
required billets, and NECs, the billets that would most benefit from IARM as well as 
rates and the individuals themselves can then be determined. 
c. Users and Supporters 
Although OCCSTDs explicitly express enlisted occupational skills needed 
for a required rate, hence making it easier to determine who needs to know IARM, 
determining the appropriate level of training is still quite difficult.  Like the officer 
community, enlisted personnel structures are designed to impart a common rating-
specific knowledge to a sailor.  By the time the sailor reaches a position of management 
within his rating, he must have a general understanding of all aspects of his rating. 
Because a rating is a broad group of related information, simply 
identifying a rating that works with IA does not necessitate IARM training.  Returning to 
the example of a ship’s crew, recall that the COMMO is the officer responsible for the 
ship’s LAN.  Working for the COMMO are enlisted personnel of the IT rating.   
Basic IT-knowledge, regardless of follow-on assignment, is taught at the 
IT-rating school (“A” school) at the beginning of an IT’s career.  “A” school teaches that 
information which is determined as being universally necessary for the rate. Specialized 
rating skills/knowledge required to perform a specific job or fill a specific billet are left 
up to focused courses (completion of which earns an NEC).   
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A very junior IT sailor (ITSN) needs to learn rate-basics before graduating 
to intermediate rate-knowledge.  Therefore, even though the IT rating is responsible for 
the ship’s LAN, the ITSN will initially be focused on the fundamentals of shipboard 
radio communication systems.  A more senior IT (IT2), who already understands radio 
communications and may hold a LAN Administrator NEC, will be the one tasked 
specifically with LAN management. 
Although there appears to be a clear break in requisite knowledge and rank 
of the IT, it is not always the case.  In the preceding example, it was assumed that the IT2 
held the LAN Management NEC.  However, what if none of the IT personnel aboard held 
the required NEC?  In this case, the ship would have to send one of its IT personnel to the 
required NEC course.  IT2 probably would not be selected to go, as his knowledge of 
radio communications would still be of use to the ship’s operations.  On the other hand, 
ITSN would be the most likely candidate to receive the NEC, as he has little knowledge 
of the IT rating and therefore is of little immediate use to the ship; because he is new to 
the ship (assuming he has just reported from “A” school he will be aboard for almost 4 
years), he will be able to fill the required NEC for the longest time. 
Even though NEC appears to have a greater impact than rate in so far as 
who would benefit from IARM training, it cannot be relied on as the only basis for 
determination.  A ship’s EDVR may reflect that only one IT is required to have a LAN 
Management NEC; however, IA issues are not reserved for that person.  Even if the 
EDVR has established the ship’s requirement for a single LAN manager, the Navy has 
established that the entire IT rating is responsible for LAN management.  In fact, the 
OCCSTD for the IT rating states “…Information Systems Technicians (IT) execute 
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information transfer with state-of-the-art multi-media technology such as fiber optics, 
digital microwave, and tactical and commercial satellites on a global basis; operate, 
manage and provide hardware and software support to multi-media Automated 
Information Systems (AIS) to include: mainframes, mini, and microcomputers, Local 
Area Networks (LAN's), Wide Area Networks (WAN's), and telecommunications; apply 
diagnostic and restoral techniques utilizing knowledge of electronic and operational 
system theory; advise on capabilities, limitations, and condition of equipment; implement 
production control procedures including input/output quality control support; implement 
and monitor security procedures; perform assigned mission organizational level 
maintenance and repair of Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and 
Intelligence Systems” (NAVPERS 18068-67B p. IT-1). 
Therefore, an IT cannot focus on one part of his rate, regardless of or in 
spite of a lack of specialized training. Instead, all of the ITs assigned to a ship are 
responsible as a whole for all aspects of their rating.  Even though ITSN may not 
completely understand LAN Management, he is expected to know and to perform some 
LAN-related tasks (e.g., install shipboard personal computers, troubleshoot, and provide 
basic assistance.)   
Herein lies the problem.  Ratings require both fundamental knowledge and 
specialized knowledge as denoted by NECs.  However, because an NEC may be 
specifically associated with a particular rating, then that specialized knowledge is 
associated with that rating’s fundamental knowledge.  If IARM were to be taught to an 
entire rating, there would be those within the rating who would not have immediate cause 
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to use it.  However, if IARM is restricted to certain NECs, then it becomes nothing more 
than a task-specific tool and not the unifying system it was designed to be.   
Consider that IT2 had the time to handle all of the IA technical issues, 
would ITSN still need IARM?  The answer is yes, but not in the same capacity as IT2. 
ITSN would still be still involved with IA, but as a user and not necessarily as a technical 
supporter, as some of his radio communication duties entail message dissemination via 
the ship’s LAN.  Therefore, even within those ratings identified as being IA technical 
support-related, personnel can be both users and supporters depending on the task they 
are performing.  Consequently, even though IARM is needed in different ways within a 
rating (i.e., specialized NEC or general rating duty) and is necessary for both technical 
support and general users, it does not change the fact that the rating needs IARM. 
Because of the dual nature of IARM in the enlisted community, an 
argument could be made that it is too difficult to establish exactly what point IARM 
should be taught.  However, this argument overlooks the benefits of all concerned with 
IA knowing IARM.  Although IARM aids the technical supporter in performance of his 
job, it also aids the user in increasing IA awareness and better understanding the technical 
supporter.  In this, its very basic role, it is clear to see that IARM would be beneficial to 
the entire rating and, therefore, should be taught at the “A” school itself.  If an IT does 
not immediately find himself in a technical supporter role, then at the very least, his “A” 
school knowledge of IARM would increase his general IA knowledge and help him 
understand and learn from those ITs who are serving in a technical support capacity.  In 
this capacity, not only does IARM perform its IA role, but also helps the IT rating better 
impart its general knowledge to its personnel.     
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3. Putting it all together 
Although there are numerous ways to categorize officer and enlisted personnel, 
how is a ship’s manning determined?  First, Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) are 
resolved.  These capabilities are the “…functions a ship is expected to perform in order to 
carry out its assigned mission” (Surface Warfare Officer Schools Command).  Next, the 
Projected Operational Environment (POE) is examined.  The POE “…establishes the 
most demanding environment in which a naval unit must operate and be fully manned 
and capable of accomplishing its mission” (Surface Warfare Officer Schools Command).  
The ROC and POE then enable a quantitative and qualitative manpower requirement to 
be derived for the ship.  (It is important to note that because this manning is based on the 
ROC and POE, it is a wartime manning.)  This derived manning requirement then 
becomes the basis for Manpower Authorization. 
The Manpower Authorization (MPA) is not the full manning determined by the 
ROC and POE, but a quantitative and qualitative requirement for the “peacetime-
manning” of the ship (Surface Warfare Officer Schools Command).  For the ship’s 
officers, billets are used, and for the enlisted personnel, NECs.   
Once the MPA has been established and the appropriate peacetime officer billets 
and enlisted NECs have been determined for the ship, monthly reports then keep track of 
the ship’s manning.  As previously discussed, the EDVR reports the current and future 
enlisted manning of the ship and summarizes specific rate/NEC shortfalls. 
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 Figure 3-6.  “Manning Documents”  (From:  Surface Warfare Officer Schools 
Command). 
 
 For officers, the Officer Distribution and Control Report (OCDR) functions 
similarly as the EDVR.  Not only do these documents help the ship plan its manning/skill 
requirements, but they also help the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) (who is 
responsible for overall manning) in assigning the correct personnel to the ship at the right 
time. 
 Where does IARM training fit into the overall manning requirements of a ship?  
The need for IARM has been examined by looking at personnel requirements, billet and 
rating requirements, and the requirement for general knowledge of IARM itself; however, 
there is yet another facet which must be discussed.  Figure 3-3 (“The Network After 
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Next”) illustrates the DoN desire to evolve toward a network-centric warfare.  If a 
network environment is in the future for the DoN, then a future ship’s POE must address 
IA.  If IA is necessary, then a ship’s ROC to adequately perform IA also becomes a 
necessity.  If a ship is destined to operate in an IA environment and be capable of 
performing IA, then IARM training must be inherent to the ship (and therefore all 
embarked personnel) from the beginning.  
 
D. IMPLEMENTING IARM INTO IT “A” SCHOOL 
Exploring the requirements for a TPP and exactly who needs to be taught IARM 
have already been examined.  To fully explore the question as to whether or not IARM 
can be implemented into existing DoN training pipelines and to stay within the scope of a 
ship’s complement, this section will explore the feasibility of implementing IARM into 
IT “A” school.   
Figure 3-1 illustrates the NETC steps necessary for course development using the 
PPP method.  In keeping with this method, this section will examine the Curriculum 
Outline of Instruction (COI), which with other documents makes up the Training Course 
Control Document (TCCD) of Stage 2.  The COI will describe the overall course outline 
and objectives and is the “…process that directly affects the “teachability” of the 
course” (NAVDTRA 131A p. 5-1-1) [emphasis added].  When completed the COI will 
describe: 1) the overall skills and training to be acquired upon course completion; 2) 
specific skills and knowledge to be acquired during each topic; 3) organization of subject 
matter into specific units of instruction and sequence of order; and 4) the developer’s 
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Career Path After Recruit Training 
Enlistees are taught the fundamentals of this rating through on-the-job training, civilian IT training academies, community colleges or 
























Microsoft, Cisco, and 
Oracle software and 
hardware fundamentals, 
ADP, security, system 




Group instruction, computer lab and ship 
simulator training.  
 
After "A" school, USN Information Systems Technicians are assigned to all types of ships and shore stations, and to communication 
stations in the United States and overseas. TAR Information Systems Technicians are assigned to NRF ships in CONUS.  Upon 
completion of sea tours, TAR ITs will be assigned to reserve centers across the country including the heartland.  While assigned to 
reserve centers TAR ITs will train and administer Selected Reserve Personnel.  During a 20-year period in the Navy, ITs spend about 
50 percent of their time assigned to fleet units and 50 percent to shore stations
Table 3-1.  “Career Path After Recruit Training” (From: “Information Systems 
Technician  (IT)”). 
 
intent with respect to the course and each unit of instruction  (NAVDTRA 131A p. 5-3-
1). 
Although NETC is specific as to exactly what criteria are needed for a finished 
COI, all criteria are not needed for the scope of this discussion.  In addition, NETC 
requires specific formats and codes for its criteria; these, too, will not be used, as they 
have little value outside of an NETC environment.      
1. Course Skills and Training 
The PPP method of course development is intended to impart the performance of 
job skills in the work place to the job standard.  Therefore, course skills and training must 
be derived from the IT rating itself.  The overall purpose of IT “A” school is to “… 
provide the basic knowledge and skills required to enable personnel to perform at the ‘job 
entry’ or apprentice level in the IT rating” (CANTRAC).  The “skills” and “knowledge” 
referred to are to “…execute information transfer with state-of-the-art multi-media 
technology such as fiber optics, digital microwave, and tactical and commercial satellites 
on a global basis; operate, manage and provide hardware and software support to multi-
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media Automated Information Systems (AIS) to include: mainframes, mini, and 
microcomputers, Local Area Networks (LANs), Wide Area Networks (WANs), and 
telecommunication; apply diagnostic and restoral techniques utilizing knowledge of 
electronic and operational system theory; advise on capabilities, limitations, and 
condition of equipment; implement production control procedures including input/output 
quality control support; implement and monitor security procedures; perform assigned 
mission organizational level maintenance and repair of Command, Control, 
Communications, Computer, and Intelligence Systems” (CANTRAC). 
From the very scope of IT “A” school, it is evident that IARM is very applicable.  
However, by looking at the scope of the course it can also be determined that the addition 
of IARM would enhance the existing curriculum and therefore does not need to be a 
stand-alone course for the IT rating.  (IARM could certainly be developed into a stand-
alone course or training package for those ITs who have not received IARM in “A” 
school.)  Because IARM would enhance the existing course and could be simply added 
into the curriculum, the current overall course objectives do not need to be altered, but 
rather merely enhanced. 
2. Specific Skills and Knowledge to be Acquired for the IARM Topic 
IARM has numerous benefits depending on how it is used.  To determine the 
skills and knowledge for the “A” school, it is important to determine how the IT will use 
the IARM he is taught.  (See “Enlisted” Section 3 “Users and Supporters.”) 
From the overall scope of the course previously examined, it is clear to see that 
the IT will use IARM as both a user and technical supporter.  However the difference is 
subtle as the in-depth knowledge of technical supporter-IARM is more than adequate to 
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also cover user-IARM.  By combining the benefits of IARM and the scope of “A” school, 
it is simple to identify goals for the IARM topic.  Therefore the goals of the IARM unit or 
the specific skills and knowledge an IT should receive from IARM training are: 
¾ Manage information assurance risks to multi-media AIS to include 
mainframes, mini-, and microcomputers, Local Area Networks (LANs), 
Wide Area Networks (WANs). 
¾ Identify information assurance assets, procedures, and risks.  
¾ Increase the level of information assurance by identifying potential 
problems. 
¾ Derive the most cost-effective and efficient corrective controls.  
¾ Assist in advising on capabilities, limitations, and condition of equipment 
by standardizing the IA syntax.  
   
3. Organization of Subject Matter  
Once topic goals are identified, the unit can be organized into a logical 
progression of topics.  LCDR Hernandez proposed topics necessary for the different 
levels of IARM training.  (See Appendix C, Sections A and B.)  By arranging these 
proposed topics into a logical progression of the unit, the following organization can be 
derived: 
¾ Fundamentals of Information Assurance (IA) 
¾ Basic vulnerability identification, tools, examples 
¾ Vulnerability assessment tools and examples 
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¾ Risk assessment tools and examples 
¾ IARM introduction concept 
¾ IARM terms and definitions 
¾ Four principles of IARM 
¾ IARM vs. traditional approach 
¾ Benefits of IARM 
¾ Three levels of IARM 
¾ Time critical IARM, examples, and demonstration 
¾ Deliberate IARM process and demonstration 
¾ Deliberate IARM practical exercise 
¾ Specific applications (demonstrating applicability to existing IA processes 
and procedures) 
 
4. Developer’s Intent with Respect to the Course and Each Unit of 
Instruction 
The goals of the overall course as well as the goals of the IARM section are 
known.  The IARM section can then be broken down into logical units. This section 
examines the developer’s intent for the progression of the course and where exactly each 
unit would be best integrated to develop this intent. 
Again, because IT “A” school is an existing course, the developers intent has 
already been established.  Implementing the IARM units must not affect the original 
intent of the overall course.  To this effect, the placement of the IARM section must be 
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examined in light of the overall course syllabus and should ensure that the individual 
units of the IARM section are not repetitive from other sections of the course. 
Table 3-2 displays the current IT “A” School computer/network units and topics.  
By comparing this table to the derived list above of required IARM topics, a logical 
sequence for the IARM unit and entire curriculum begins to evolve.   
Unit 3, Topic 3.1 covers an introduction to Information Systems Security 
(INFOSEC).  In this section, definitions, threat categories, computer vulnerabilities and 
countermeasures are discussed (“Information Systems Technician ‘A’ School”).  (See 
Table 3-3.)  This section provides the most appropriate place to introduce the topics 
“Fundamentals of Information Assurance (IA),” “Basic vulnerability identification, tools, 
examples,” “Vulnerability assessment tools and examples,” and “Risk assessment tools 
and examples,” as most of the information contained in these topics pre-exists in this 
section.  Although the addition of these IARM topics into Unit 3 would require a small 
change of the existing material, it is better to integrate IARM topics where applicable 
than to add a stand-alone IARM unit that may be repetitive of previously-presented 
topics. 
Following Topic 3.1, the introduction of the remaining IARM topics—“IARM 
introduction concept,” “IARM terms and definitions,” “Four principles of IARM,” 
“IARM vs. traditional approach,” “Benefits of IARM,” “Three levels of IARM,” “Time 
critical IARM, examples and demonstration,” “Deliberate IARM process and 
demonstration,” “Deliberate IARM practical exercise,” and “Specific applications 
(demonstrating applicability to existing IA processes and procedures)”—could be added  
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UNIT TOPIC TITLE 
1.1 Introduction to the Information Systems Technician Rating 1 
1.2 Information Technology for the 21st Century (IT-21) Overview 
2.1 Introduction to Computers 
2.2 Computer Hardware 
2 
2.3 Computer Software 
3 3.1 Introduction to Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) 
4 4.1 System Administrator Duties and Responsibilities 
5 5.1 Microcomputer Preoperations 
6.1 Windows NT Environment 
6.2 Preparing for and Installing Windows NT 
6.3 Windows NT Boot Process 
6.4 Windows NT Control Panel 
6.5 Windows NT File System (NTFS) 
6.6 Windows NT Partitions 
6 
6.7 Windows NT Fault Tolerance 
7.1 Data Communications 
7.2 Introduction to Networks  
7.3 Network Components 
7.4 Introduction to Network Theory 
7.5 Advanced Network Theory 
7 
7.6 Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) 
8.1 Windows NT Networking Environment 
8.2 Configuring and Installing Protocols 
8.3 Network Browsing—Computer Browser 
8.4 Installing and Configuring WINS and DNS 
8.5 Domains and Creating Computer Accounts in a Domain  
8.6 User and Group Accounts 
8.7 Shared Folder Security 
8.8 Windows NT File System (NTFS) Security 
8.9 Windows NT Printing 
8.10 Backing Up and Restoring Data 
8.11 Configuring and Managing Internet Services 
8.12 Web Browsing 
8 
8.13 Uninstalling Windows NT 
9.1 Database Fundamentals 9 
9.2 Microsoft Access 
10 10.1 Microsoft (MS) Applications 
11 11.1 UNIX Operating System 
12 12.1 Navy Networks 
13.1 Computer Maintenance Fundamentals 13 
13.2 Microcomputer Troubleshooting and Upgrading 
 
Table 3-2.  IT “A” School Computer/Network Curriculum (From: “Information Systems 




Unit Topic Title 




1.  Threats to Information Systems 
2.  Computer Crime 
3.  Threats to Security 
4.  Computer Vulnerabilities 
5.  Countermeasures 
3 3.1 
6.  Computer Security Incident Reporting 
 
Table 3-3.  “Introduction to Information Systems Security (INFOSEC)” Breakdown (From: 
“Information Systems Technician ‘A’ School”). 
 
as Topic 3.2.  (See Table 3-4.)  This would ensure a logical flow of the IARM topics 
added in Topic 3.1 and would provide the least disruption to the remainder of the current 
curriculum organization.  In addition, adding IARM as Topic 3.2 would also make a 
logical progression into Topic 4.1, which discusses duties and responsibilities of the 
system administrator and which would greatly benefit from IARM knowledge. 
Although it can be argued that topics important to fully understanding IARM (i.e., 
networks) are not introduced until later in the curriculum, introducing IARM as Topic 3.2 
would still be the most logical sequence.  An understanding of networks would be 
beneficial to fully utilizing IARM, but it is not essential for comprehending IARM basics.  
However, a brief review of IARM and/or more applications of IARM could be included 
in Unit 7.  (It is interesting to note that the only unit that discusses security of any kind is 
Unit 3.  An additional topic on network security (e.g., as Topic 7.7) would be very 
beneficial and would provide another great place to discuss IARM.) 
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 Unit Topic Title LOs 





1.  Threats to Information Systems 
2.  Computer Crime 
Describe the threats and impacts 
to information systems. 
3.  Threats to Security/ Fundamentals 
of Information Assurance (IA) 
4.  Computer Vulnerabilities/ Basic 
vulnerability identification, tools, 
examples  
Describe prominent information 
system threats and threat 
categories. 
Describe the types of computer 
vulnerabilities and impact each 
vulnerability has on IA. 
 
5.  Countermeasures/Vulnerability 
assessment tools and examples 
6.  Risk assessment tools and 
examples 
3.1 
7.  Computer Security Incident 
Reporting 
Identify the countermeasures 
used in protecting information 
systems. 
 





1.  IARM Introduction Concept 
2.  IARM Terms and Definitions 
3.  Four Principles of IARM 
Describe the origins of IARM  
Describe the IARM process. 
4.  IARM vs. Traditional Approach 
5.  Benefits of IARM 
Identify the numerous benefits of 
IARM. 
6.  Three Levels of IARM 
7.  Time Critical IARM 
     A.  Examples 
     B.  Demonstration 
8.  Deliberate IARM Process 
     A.  Demonstration 
     B.  Practical Exercise 
Describe the IARM levels of 




9.  Specific Applications 
(demonstrating applicability to 
existing IA processes and 
procedures) 
Describe how IARM will assist 
the IT in the Fleet by using 
applicable examples.  
 
Table 3-4.  Proposed “Unit 3” with integrated IARM Topics. 
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 5. Lesson Plans 
Figure 3-1 illustrates the NETC steps necessary for course development using the 
PPP method.  In keeping with this method, this section will examine compiling course 
information from earlier stages into a Lesson Plan, which begins Stage 3.  (Development 
of course materials is suggested for follow-on research; however, the introduction of a 
basic lesson plan nicely illustrates the complete integration of IARM into an existing 
curriculum.)  According to NAVEDTRA 131A, a lesson plan contains, among other 
things,  “…Learning Objectives (LOs) that reflect the skills and knowledge to be attained 
upon successful completion of the course” and “…an outline of instructional materials to 
be taught in a logical and efficient manner” (p. 6-1-1).   
Table 3-4 outlines a logical sequence of topics and main points for the proposed 
Unit 3.  Using this sequence of topics and main points, the required outline for a lesson 
plan also becomes evident.  Using Table 3-4 as an outline for the new lesson plan, the 
following sections identify specific LOs for each topic.  (These LOs are a combination of 
LOs from existing “A” school topics and proposed IARM LOs.) 
 a. Topic 3.1: Introduction to Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) 
The proposed Topic 3.1 is a combination of existing material and new 
IARM material.  Therefore, the original LOs are still applicable but may require the 
addition of new LOs for the IARM matter.  According to IT “A” School the original LOs 
are:  
¾ Describe the threats to information systems. 
¾ Describe prominent information system threats and threat 
categories. 
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¾ Describe the types of computer vulnerabilities. 
¾ Identify the countermeasures used in protecting information 
systems. 
By grouping the main points identified in Topic 3.1 with their associated 
LOs (See Table 3-4), the need or lack thereof for additional LOs can be determined.  
Because Topic 3.1 already contained the same main points as the added IARM material, 
it becomes evident that the existing LOs are sufficient. 
b. Topic 3.2: Introduction to IARM 
Topic 3.2 was non-existent before the introduction of the IARM material, 
so there are no LOs.   Using the outline of main points from Table 3-4 and the goals of 
the IARM unit identified in Section 2, LOs can be determined. 
(1) Describe the origins of IARM / 3.2 DESCRIBE the IARM 
process.  These LOs ensure the student is introduced to the IARM concept and process.  
Using LCDR Hernandez’s thesis as reference material, the student becomes indoctrinated 
into the basics of IARM. 
(2) Identify the numerous benefits of IARM.  This LO 
demonstrates the numerous benefits of IARM and its superiority over the traditional 
method of IA.  By identifying the benefits of IARM, the student will realize its usefulness 
and will be more inclined to incorporate IARM in the future.  This thesis and LCDR 
Hernandez’s thesis can be used as reference material.  
(3) Describe the IARM levels of applications and their 
associated steps.  This LO ensures that the student is indoctrinated into the different 
levels of IARM.  By introducing the levels of IARM application through demonstrations 
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and practical exercises, the student will understand that IARM can be applied differently 
depending on the circumstances.  LCDR Hernandez’s thesis can be used as reference 
material.   
(4) Describe how IARM will assist the IT in the Fleet by using 
applicable examples.  This LO wraps up the IARM topic and ensures that the student 
understands that IARM is useful to his future job.  Through demonstrations of IARM’s 
applicability to the IA process and IT rate, IARM’s usefulness is emphasized.  LCDR 
Hernandez’s thesis or personal examples from the instructor can be used as reference 
material.        
 
E. SUMMARY 
Different categorizations of DoN personnel need IARM for numerous reasons.  
Whether IARM is needed to accomplish a certain job/billet or is fundamentally required 
for an overall designator/rating, it is evident that there are pre-existing ways of 
determining who should receive IARM training. 
It has also been demonstrated that IARM can be integrated into an existing 
training syllabus, but can it be integrated into all of the training pipelines Navy-wide?  
The answer is dependent upon the scale of integration.  Because IT “A” school is already 
teaching INFOSEC, most of the information needed to understand IARM is already 
present.  Therefore certain IARM topics can be directly integrated into existing material, 
and those topics that cannot still fit logically into existing units.  However as previously 
discussed IARM is not limited to only those training courses related to networks or 
computer security.  Although the purpose of SWOS is to teach new officers to become 
SWOs (see Section C.1.e of this Chapter), it was demonstrated that the introduction of 
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IARM into the SWOS curriculum would also be very beneficial to those officers.  
However, because the SWOS curriculum does not have related information assurance 
topics, the addition of IARM would therefore necessitate it being a stand-alone unit.  
Whether directly integrated into existing material, or standing alone as a separate unit in 
an existing curriculum, the integration of IARM into existing DoN training is beneficial 
and feasible. 
While IARM training can be readily implemented into current training pipelines, 
it may not be enough.  It was established that as the Navy becomes more network-centric, 
its missions, personnel, and equipment would also become more IA-reliant.  Because this 
is the direction the Navy has chosen, not only will IARM be applicable to those rates 
identified earlier, but to the entire Department of the Navy.  To this end, the Navy must 








LCDR Hernandez developed IARM as an answer to the lack of an overall DoN 
IA strategy.  Through the Navy’s numerous organizations, overlapping policies, and 
fragmentation of IA-related personnel, it becomes evident that IARM is still needed.  Not 
only would IARM answer all of the current Navy IA-objectives, but it would also offer 
the potential to grow and adapt as the Navy’s IA needs become more extensive. 
The CNO currently requires IA training and, therefore, would also require IARM 
training should the latter be adopted.  Current NETC IA courses do not meet all of the 
Navy’s IA needs.  Although these courses do offer some level of IA training, nothing 
currently exists for all Navy personnel that offers all of the benefits of IARM.  Because 
of this training void, the need for IARM training or an IARM course becomes evident.  
Though IARM has yet to be adopted, it has been demonstrated that there is enough 
preliminary NETC-required information to undertake immediate development of such a 
course.    
Looking at the basic categorizations of DoN personnel, it was established that 
different personnel need IARM for numerous reasons.  Whether IARM is needed to 
accomplish a certain job/billet or is fundamentally required for an overall 
designator/rating, it is evident that there are existing ways of determining exactly to 
whom IARM should be taught.  By determining who should receive IARM training and 
why, it became evident that IARM training could easily be implemented into existing 
training pipelines, such as rating A/C school, billet-specific school, or designator schools. 
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While IARM training can be readily implemented into current training pipelines, 
it may not be enough.  It was established that as the Navy becomes more network-centric, 
its missions, personnel, and equipment would also become more IA-reliant.  Because this 
is the direction the Navy has chosen, not only will IARM be applicable to those rates 
identified earlier, but to the entire Department of the Navy.  To this end, the Navy must 
implement IARM in whatever manner that will most easily impact all personnel.   
  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS   
 
1. Pilot Program 
Though IARM would be useful to the DoN as a whole, implementation of a 
smaller pilot program would be beneficial in demonstrating IARM usefulness and in 
identifying further areas of IARM study.  Figure 3.3 lists a pilot program as one of the 
NAVEDTRA stages to course development.  However, by implementing an “unofficial” 
pilot program, using nothing more than LCDR Hernandez’s thesis and Power Point 
slides, before the development of a course is actually undertaken, many of the questions 
this thesis attempted to answer can be more thoroughly derived. 
A pilot program aboard a single ship would be easily implemented and beneficial 
to both the decision makers and technical experts aboard.  By giving the Wardroom 
simple IARM training, it would benefit their abilities to make better decisions concerning 
IA and IA resources.  For the technical experts, such as the ITs and EWs, IARM would 
increase the general understanding and, consequently, level of IA, increase the 
understanding of current shipboard IA systems and resources, and identify other ratings 
or personnel that should also be taught IARM.   
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Despite the fact that there would be numerous interactions aboard a single ship 
benefited by IARM, the extent of implementation may not be large enough to fully 
develop all of IARM’s potential.  A single ship is one small node in the DoN network; 
implementation on such a small scale would benefit the node itself, but would provide 
little data as to IARM benefits for the network as a whole.  Perhaps a better pilot 
implementation would be that of an entire Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and its 
associated network operation center (NOC).  While the initial training would be greater 
due to the greater number of people to be trained, it would provide a much more thorough 
and realistic test of IARM. 
2. New Ideas on Training 
To be fully applicable to the DoN, Navy publications were used extensively in 
this research to support current DoN policy and organization.  Although it was necessary 
to work within these boundaries to establish whether or not it was possible to implement 
IARM, Navy methods of training are not necessarily the best or only way training can be 
accomplished. 
Admiral Vern Clark, the current CNO, has made Navy training and education one 
of his primary focuses during his tenure.  From this focus, numerous studies have 
examined the outdated way the Navy trains its personnel.  As a result, programs such as 
“Task Force Excel” are attempting to revamp Navy training and produce Navy personnel 
more aligned to the current and present DoN organization. 
Although it was necessary to examine IARM in light of current training and 
manning policies in order to establish its credibility and necessity to the DoN, IARM 
training could be a test subject for the CNO’s new training ideas.  IARM is certainly 
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necessary for the Fleet and is capable of being taught in existing training pipelines, but 
why not use a new training method to implement IARM training?  Not only would the 
Fleet be learning something it needs to know, but the Navy would also be able to 
simultaneously test its training ideas.   
 
C. FUTURE AREAS OF STUDY 
LCDR Hernandez’s thesis developed the idea of IARM.  It was the attempt of this 
thesis to examine how IARM could be taught Navy-wide.  Realizing the importance of 
IARM, follow-on work in further development of an IARM course would be most 
beneficial.   
 1. Naval Education and Training Command Course Requirements 
The NAVEDTRA series lists criteria for teaching materials needed for a NETC 
course or training module.  Using these guidelines, further development for IARM 
training could be studied in development of: 1) management materials, 2) curriculum 
materials, and 3) support materials. 
Developing IARM training material and filling in NETC required information 
would not only be a worthwhile follow-on thesis, but would also complete another step in 
actually implementing IARM Navy-wide. (If “Task Force Excel” surpasses the 
NAVEDTRA manuals, constructing an IARM training course under “Task Force Excel” 
criteria would also be beneficial.)  
 2. Pilot Program Study 
Implementation of a pilot IARM program would also be interesting follow-on 
work.  Though students at NPS would have a difficult time implementing IARM on a 
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large scale, they could try to implement IARM at the Postgraduate School itself and study 
its effects.  Though this would be a relatively small-scale program, a successful pilot at 
NPS could result in excellent exposure for IARM and pave the way for a larger 
implementation.   
A larger pilot program could also be interesting and prove useful as follow-on 
work. Though a larger pilot-program would have to be sponsored by a larger DoN 
organization, thesis students could be used to compile results, analyze findings, and make 
recommendations.    
 3. IARM in the Department of Defense and the Civilian World 
Numerous benefits have been discussed for implementing IARM in the DoN.  
However, these benefits do not apply solely to DoN assets.  Even as the DoN becomes 
more network-centered, so does the DoD.  IARM could provide the same benefits to all 
of the DoD, thereby increasing IA DoD-wide.  Not only would IARM facilitate an 
increase in IA, but its common language would also facilitate “joint communications,” 
and possibly lead to a truly joint IA policy and organization. 
The DoD also realizes that civilian networks are becoming more important as they 
are becoming more intertwined with those of the DoD.  Teaching IARM to civilians 
would also benefit National IA, as the entire infrastructure would now be speaking the 
same language.   Though implementation of IARM in DoD and civilian networks would 
be difficult to study, it would nonetheless prove to be an enormous benefit.      
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D. FINAL COMMENTS 
While it was necessary to distinguish between users and supporters, and officers 
and enlisted, to illustrate the necessity for IARM and where and how it may be properly 
implemented in the DoN, it may have inadvertently caused an even greater peculiarity 
between the groups.  IARM, by its very nature, strives to eliminate distinctions.     
Although there is a different knowledge requisite between users and technical 
supporters, and hence a need for either training or education, it does not necessarily have 
to impact IARM directly.  IARM is designed to be a stand-alone process that facilitates 
information assurance risk management for whomever uses the process regardless of the 
level of their IA education or training.  The IARM process is designed to be simple 
enough for a user to understand the risks involved without actually having to understand 
the technical background, yet robust enough to allow the technical supporter to better 
perform his job.  In fact, the DoN organization itself has already designated who will be a 
user and who will be a technical supporter and to that end provided the appropriate level 
of either background training or education.  Perhaps a stand-alone IARM class is not as 
necessary as is simply incorporating IARM training into existing designator, rank, billet, 
or rating schools.   
IARM strives to bring the user and technical supporter together, so an IARM 
training course should not differentiate between the two.  It is important to remember that 
as the Navy becomes more network-centric, more and more DoN personnel will have to 
become network users.  Even basic users would benefit from IARM training.  To this 
end, IARM turns once more to the vision of its cousin ORM; “the naval vision is to 
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develop an environment where every [emphasis added] leader, Sailor, Marine and civilian 
is trained and motivated to personally manage risk in everything they do, both in 
peacetime and during conflict, thus successfully completing all operations with minimum 
risk” (OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3500.39A p. 2).  To accomplish this ORM vision, the 
Navy simply stated, “ORM will be included in the orientation and training of all military 
personnel” (OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3500.39A p. 2) [emphasis added].  Why reinvent 
the wheel?  IARM is to Information Assurance as ORM is to Operations.  Adopt IARM 
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APPENDIX A.  NAVY INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) 
PROGRAM 
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 
2000 NAVY PENTAGON 
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000
 





9 November 1999 
 
OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5239.1B 
 
From: Chief of Naval Operations 
To:  All Ships and Stations (less Marine Corps field addresses not having Navy 
personnel attached) 
 
Subj: NAVY INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) PROGRAM 
 
Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5239.3 of 14 Jul 95, Department of the Navy Information 
Systems Security (INFOSEC) (NOTAL) 
(b) DoD 5220.22-M of January 95, National Industrial Security Program     
Operating Manual (NISPOM) 
(c) Public Key Infrastructure Roadmap for the Department of Defense, Version 
2.0, Revision C, June 15, 1999 
(d) CNO N64 Attack, Protect, Exploit Requirements Action Forum Charter 
(e) Department of the Navy Chief Information Officer Information Technology 
Standards Guidance (ITSG) (NOTAL) 
(f) DoD Instruction 5200.40 of 30 Dec 97, Department of Defense Information 
Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (NOTAL) 
(g) CNO Memo 1500 Ser N7/8U637313 of 14 Oct 98 (Subj: Navy 
Communications, Information Systems, and Networks (CISN) Training 
Strategy to Support Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance/Information Operations 
(C4ISR/IO)) (NOTAL) 
(h) NSTISSI No. 4012, of August 1997, National Training Standard for 
Designated Approving Authority (DAA) (NOTAL) (i) OPNAVINST 2201.2 
of 3 March 1998, Navy and Marine Corps Computer Network Incident 
Response 
 
Encl: (1) List of Acronyms 
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1.  Purpose.  To establish policies and procedures for the U.S. Navy’s Information 
Assurance (IA) Program, and implement the provisions of reference (a).  This instruction 
is a complete revision and should be reviewed in its entirety. 
 
2.  Cancellation.  OPNAVINST 5239.1A. 
 
3.  Applicability.  This instruction applies to all Navy activities, organizations and 
contractors that enter, process, store, or transmit unclassified, sensitive but unclassified 
(SBU) or classified National Security information using information systems or networks 
at Navy activities, and to contractor operated or owned facilities under Navy authority, 
which shall also comply with the guidelines of reference (b).  This instruction 
encompasses all information systems and networks that are procured, developed, 
modified, operated, maintained, or managed by Navy organizational elements.  If 
information in this policy conflicts with other issued policy, the more stringent policy 
applies.  Enclosure (1) provides a list of acronyms used throughout this instruction. 
 
4.  Background 
 
a.  Information Assurance is defined in Joint Pub 3-13 “Joint Doctrine for Information 
Operations” (9 October 1998) as:  
 
“Information operations that prOteCt and defefl information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation.  This includes prwiding for restoration of 
information syeteme by incorporating Protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities.” 
 
b.  The security challenges confronting Navy information and information systems 
are multiplying rapidly with the exponential growth of interconnected systems for 
producing and exchanging data and information.  As intercomectivity increases and the 
threats to information and information systems become more sophisticated and diverse, 








The fast-paced advances of technology drive Navy reliance on commercial technologies 
and services; however, many of these solutions may offer only minimal defense against 
IA threat activity and must be augmented by IA disciplines and focused management 
decisions to ensure protection of Navy information and information systems. 
 
c.  Information Assurance Properties and Services.  Information and information 
systems must be properly managed and protected as required by law, regulation or treaty.  
Facilitating the management and protection of resources requires the appropriate 
implementation of security measures providing the IA properties and services of: 
  
(1) Confidentiality, which supports the protection of both sensitive and classified 
information from unauthorized disclosure. 
 
(2) Integrity, which supports protection of information against unauthorized 
modification or destruction. 
 
(3) Availability, which supports timely, reliable access to data and information 
systems for authorized users, and precludes denial of service or access. 
 
(4) Authentication, which supports verifying the identity of an individual or entity 
and the authority to access specific categories of information. 
 
(5) Non-repudiation, which provides assurance to the sender of data with proof of 
delivery and to the recipient of the sender's identity, so that neither can later deny having 
processed the data. 
 
d.  Mission Criticality.  Assessing the security requirements of any information 
system for the five IA properties requires a determination of the criticality of the 
information system to the organization’s mission, particularly the warfighter’s combat 
mission.  Five categories of criticality are defined in reference (c), Administrative, 
Mission Support, and three categories classified as Mission Critical, although an 
information system may have components that fit in more than one category.  Mission 
criticality is one of the key determinants of 
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information security requirements, the level of effort appropriate to the certification and 
accreditation of systems, and the technologies appropriate for implementing the required 
safeguards. 
 
e.  Information Sensitivity.  Information Assurance requirements also depend on the 
need to control disclosure.  Disclosure may be restricted either because of national 
security classification levels (Confidential, Secret, Top Secret), because of Special 
Access (Single Integrated Operations Plan — SIOP -- or Sensitive Compartmented 
Information — SCI) requirements, or for other sensitivity.  Sensitive information is any 
information the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to, or modification of which could 
adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of federal programs, or the privacy of 
Department of Defense personnel, but that has not been specifically authorized to be kept 
classified.  Unclassified national security information, Privacy Act data, personal 
information (such as medical records, fitness reports and performance evaluations), 
proprietary, source selection sensitive, nuclear propulsion information, operations or 
mission information may be considered sensitive information. 
 
5.  Objectives.  The Chief of Naval Operations directs the implementation of the Navy IA 
program, through the policy set forth in this instruction, to:  
 
a.  Protect information and resources to the degree commensurate with their value. 
 
b.  Employ efficient procedures and cost-effective, information-based security 
features on all information technology resources procured, developed, operated, 
maintained, or managed by Navy organizational elements to protect the information on 
those resources.  An analysis of costs and benefits should be used determine which 
procedures and security features are appropriate, including a realistic assessment of the 








c.  Adopt a risk-based life cycle management approach in applying uniform standards 
for the protection of Navy information technology resources that produce, process, store, 
or transmit information. 
 
d.  Conduct an assessment of threats, identify the appropriate combination of 
safeguards from the IA disciplines, and apply an appropriate level of certification and 
accreditation for each specific information system developed by a program office and for 
each site employing networks and deployed information systems. 
 
6.  Policy.  All Navy information and resources shall be appropriately safeguarded at all 
times, to support defense-indepth across Navy and DoD.  Safeguards shall be applied 
such that information and resources maintain the appropriate level of confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, authentication, and non-repudiation based upon mission criticality, 
level of required information assurance and classification or sensitivity level of 
information entered, processed, stored, or transmitted.  The safeguarding of information 
and information systems shall be accomplished through the employment of multi-
disciplined defensive layers, as well as sound administrative and operational practices. 
 
7.  IA Requirements.  IA Requirements should be validated by the Fleet Commanders-in-
chief or other Echelon II Commanders and forwarded to the CNO N64 
Attack/Protect/Exploit (CAPER) Action Forum, via CNO N643.  The principle mission 
of the CAPER Action Forum is to review, clarify, define and validate certain CNO 
sponsored program issues and requirements for the operating forces of the United States 
Navy. 
 
8.  Information Assurance Publications.  The IA Publication series provide specific 
guidance and direction on implementation of this instruction for Navy, and as such, are 
extensions of the policies herein.  The IA publications detail specific roles and 
responsibilities and reflect the latest affordable, acceptable, and supportable procedures 
and products to ensure the security and protection of Navy information.  IA Pub 01 
introduces and summarizes the Department of the Navy’s approach to IA.  Pub 01 is 
intended to foster a common understanding of IA principles, concepts, and 
interrelationships among system planners,  
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organizational managers, Information Systems Security Officers and Managers, and 
users.  Appendix A to IA Pub 01 lists and describes the current and planned IA Pubs.  
The IA publications are maintained by Director, Communications Security (COMSEC) 
Material System (DCMS) and shall be updated routinely.  The IA Pubs are available on 
the NIPRNET and the SIPRNET at the INFOSEC Web Site. 
 
9.  Responsibilities 
 
a.  Organizational Responsibilities.   
 
(1) Chief Of Naval Operations (CNO).  The CNO is responsible for ensuring full 
implementation and coordination of Navy IA Program execution with the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (ASN) Research Development & Acquisition (RD&A) and Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (DASN) Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers and Intelligence/Electronic Warfare/Space (C4I/EW/Space).  The CNO 
executes this responsibility by: 
 
(a) Appointing the Navy Senior Information Systems Security Manager 
(SISSM) with authority as the Navy principal Designated Approving Authority (DAA) 
for collateral/GENSER classified and sensitive but unclassified information systems. 
 
(b) For the Navy, the CNO has appointed the Director, Space, Information 
Warfare, Command and Control (N6) as the SISSM.  (c) CNO (N6) has delegated the 
duties of Navy SISSM to CNO (N643). 
 
(d) Directing the SISSM to ensure execution of responsibilities outlined in 
reference (a) and to develop the procedures and policies necessary to implement higher 
directives and regulations. 
 
(e) Appointing CNO (N89) as the DAA for all Special Access Programs. 
 
(f) Appointing CNO (N3/N5) as the DAA for all Single Integrated Operations 
Plan (SIOP) programs. 
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(g) Appointing Director, Office of Naval Intelligence as the DAA for all 
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) programs. 
 
(h) Appointing Commander, Naval Security Group Command as the DAA for 
all cryptologic systems and SCI physical facilities under their cognizance. 
 
(2) CNO (N643) shall: 
 
(a) Oversee the Navy IA Program.  Provide streamlined, simplified and 
standardized security guidance and policy.   
 
(b) Approve and issue the Navy IA Master Plan. 
 
(c) Represent IA Requirements submitted by Fleet Commanders-in-Chief and 
other Echelon II Commanders to the CNO N64 Attack, Protect, Exploit Requirements 
Action Forum (CAPER AF) (ref (d)). 
 
(d) In coordination with Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (COMSPAWARSYSCOM) (PMW-161), develop and issue standards for 
critical IA components (e.g.  firewalls, virtual private networks (VPNs), intrusion 
detection systems (IDSs)), for use within Navy information systems and networks.  
Critical IA components are those which, to ensure interoperability with other Navy, joint 
or other DoD systems, must be standardized and managed at a service level.  Standards 
will be documented in the DoN CIO Information Technology Standards Guidance, 
Chapter 3 (ref (e)). 
 
(e) Represent CNO as the DAA for Navy-wide and joint service information 
systems (where Navy is the assigned lead).  Assign DAAs and ensure the accreditation of 
all Navy information technology resources.  CNO (N643) further delegates DAA 
authority to second echelon commanders for acquisition and development of information 
systems within their cognizance.  Further delegation of this DAA authority is limited to 
officers of the grade of O-6 or above and civilians of grade GS-15 or equivalent except 
by prior coordination with and authorization from CNO (N643). 
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(f) Provide Navy representation to the DoD Information Assurance Panel, 
subordinate working groups and other DoD-level working groups and study groups 
relating to IA. 
 
(g) Coordinate Navy submission of reports on IA postures, to include training 
initiatives and overall progress in meeting IA goals and objectives. 
 
(h) Oversee Navy IA training requirements and provide requirements to the 
Communications, Information Systems, and Networks (CISN) Training Working Group 
(see item (7)). 
 
(3) Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
(COMSPAWARSYSCOM) (PMW-161) is the Department of the Navy’s IA Program 
Manager.  As such COMSPAWARSYSCOM (PMW-161) shall: 
 
(a) Ensure full coordination of Navy IA program execution with CNO (N643), 
COMNAVSECGRU, COMSPAWARSYSCOM (PMW- 162) and Headquarters USMC. 
 
(b) Draft and maintain the Navy IA Master Plan as requested by CNO (N643), 
and in coordination with CNO N64 Attack/Protect/Exploit Requirements (CAPER) 
Action Forum, Headquarters Marine Corps, COMNAVSECGRU, and other Naval 
Systems Commands.  The IA Master Plan shall include identification and formal 
documentation of IA goals and objectives for Navy, a strategy for achieving those goals 
and objectives, a description of IA programs, projects and initiatives that will result in the 
capabilities needed, and an IA risk management plan.  The Navy IA Master Plan and 
updates as required will be submitted to CNO (N643) for approval and issuance.   
 
(c) Submit Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) requirements to support 
IA programs as delineated in the Navy IA Master Plan. 
 








(e) As the technical lead for Navy IA, provide systems and security 
engineering and integration testing and support for Navy information systems and 
networks with IA requirements.  Provide input, review, and recommended updates to IA 
Publications.  Establish and execute capability to provide on-site assessments to Navy 
commands, including vulnerability assessments coordinated by FIWC. 
 
(f) Maintain a Navy IA research and development program to meet Navy 
requirements in accordance with the Non- Acquisition Program Decision Document 
(NAPDD) and as delineated in the Navy IA Master Plan.  Coordinate IA R&D activities 
with the Office of Naval Research to ensure maximum and smooth transition of new 
technologies to operating forces, fully integrated for maximum cost effectiveness with 
existing technologies. 
 
(g) As the Navy’s Certification Authority: 
 
1.  Provide high-level oversight and standardization for the system 
certification and accreditation process for all Service, Joint, development and acquisition 
programs across Navy. 
 
2.  Advise program managers and DAAs in their responsibility to assign a 
capable Certification Agent responsible for completing the certification and accreditation 
process in accordance with the Defense Information Technology Security Certification 
and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP), reference (f). 
 
3.  Establish and maintain a master file of Navy accredited systems and 
major network operations centers (NOCs).  Ensure supporting certification and 
accreditation documents are analyzed for lessons learned, identification of system 
deficiencies and for incorporation in process improvements and the Navy IA Master Plan. 
 
(h) Develop and centrally acquire Navy standard and specified IA products.  
Provide life cycle management support for centrally procured IA products and systems, 
to include operations and maintenance funding. 
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(i) Maintain the Navy INFOSEC Web Site and IA Help Desk as directed by 
CNO (N643). 
 
1.  Navy INFOSEC Web Site.  The Navy INFOSEC Web Site on the 
World Wide Web provides access to the Navy IA Publications, as well as other IA related 
references, advisories and announcements, and a variety of resources on IA issues across 
Navy, the Department of Defense and other services and agencies.  The INFOSEC Web 
Site URL on the Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) is 
http://infosec.navy.mil/.  On the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) the 
URL is http://infosec.navy.smil.mil/. 
 
2.  Information Assurance Help Desk.  For routine technical and 
engineering assistance, an IA Help Desk has been established under 
COMSPAWARSYSCOM (PMW-161) to support Navy and Marine Corps commands on 
IA matters and provide guidance on specific questions for securing and certifying 
systems.  The Help Desk is available at 1-800-304-4636. 
 
(j) Support Navy Computer Network Defense by providing network analysis 
and management tools to support the Navy Component Task Force – Computer Network 
Defense (NCTF-CND) mission. 
 
(4) COMSPAWARSYSCOM (PMW-162) shall conduct IA Vulnerability 
Assessments in support of the DITSCAP Certification and Accreditation process for 
developing systems. 
 
(5) Commanders of Systems Commands and other Navy development and 
acquisition activities shall ensure Program Managers integrate information assurance 
requirements in the design of information systems and that all systems are delivered to 
naval customers with certification documentation to support accreditation requirements 
of ref (f). 
 
(6) Commander, Naval Security Group Command (COMNAVSECGRU) shall: 
 
(a) Serve as DAA for accreditation of Cryptologic systems and networks.  
Coordinate the Navy Service Cryptologic Element (SCE) program with the National 
Security Agency (NSA). 
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(b) Serve as DAA for SCI physical facilities under COMNAVSECGRU 
cognizance. 
 
(c) Provide support, as coordinated by FIWC, in the conduct of vulnerability 
assessments and Red and Blue Team operations. 
 
(7) The Communications, Information Systems, and Networks (CISN) Training 
Working Group, established under reference (g), shall: 
 
(a) Identify Navy IA billet and training requirements. 
 
(b) Ensure development of Navy training plans for information systems. 
 
(c) Establish IA training requirements for military and civilian personnel. 
 
(8) Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) shall: 
(a) Develop Navy schoolhouse IA training and education. 
 
(b) Ensure IA training is incorporated into all pertinent Navy training and 
appropriate formal schools. 
 
(9) Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC) shall:  
 
(a) Manage the Naval Computer Incident Response Team (NAVCIRT) for 
Navy; The NAVCIRT, located at FIWC, serves as the Navy primary computer incident 
response capability to provide assistance in identifying, assessing, containing, and 
countering incidents that threaten Navy information systems and networks.  On request 
NAVCIRT will offer hands-on assistance to selected naval activities, such as deployed 
ships, that are under cyberattack.  FIWC will collaborate and coordinate Navy efforts 
with other Government and commercial activities to identify, assess, contain, and counter 
the impact of computer incidents on national security communications and information 








(b) Provide CNO (N64) with monthly, quarterly, and annual summaries of 
reported Navy computer incidents. 
 
(c) Provide timely advisories of newly identified vulnerabilities. 
 
(d) Conduct on-line surveys for fielded systems. 
 
(e) Provide vulnerability assessments and Red and Blue Team operations to 
requesting commands.  Coordinate resources provided by COMNAVSECGRU and 
COMSPAWARSYSCOM PMW-161 as required. 
 
(f) Provide intrusion detection monitoring, on-line surveys, and activity 
analysis and assessment in support of the NCTF-CND (see item 13). 
 
(10) Director, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) shall: 
 
(a) Coordinate Navy IA requirements for the Navy SCI/Intelligence program 
and the Navy portion of the DoD Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) with the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 
 
(b) Serve as DAA for Navy SCI systems. 
 
(c) Assist CNO (N643) and COMSPAWARSYSCOM (PMW-161) by 
gathering relevant threat information to assist in defining system security requirements. 
 
(d) Provide all-source, fused intelligence support to the NCTF-CND (see item 
13). 
 
(11) Commander, Naval Computer and Telecommunications Command (NCTC) 
shall: 
(a) Coordinate Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) connection approval 
with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) for Navy information systems and 
sites.  Ensure sites with DII connections meet DISA accreditation requirements. 
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(b) As required, provide Internet web-hosting and demilitarized zone (DMZ) 
services for afloat units and small shore commands.  A DMZ is a dedicated network 
segment that is used to separate public services from internal services. 
 
(c) Ensure shore-based infrastructure solutions incorporate appropriate IA 
safeguards. 
 
(d) Provide network operations, including monitoring and restoral functions in 
support of the NCTF-CND (see item 13). 
 
(12) Director, COMSEC Material System (DCMS) shall: 
 
(a) Maintain Central Office of Record (COR), ensuring the proper storage, 
distribution, inventory, accounting, and overall safeguarding of COMSEC materials for 
the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, Military Sealift Command, and joint and 
allied commands, as required. 
 
(b) Maintain the IA Publication Library as directed by CNO (N643). 
 
(c) Control, warehouse, and distribute cryptographic equipment, ancillaries 
and associated keying material for all Navy. 
 
(d) Under CNO (N643) direction, issue, publish and distribute guidance 
necessary to ensure National level (e.g., NSA) policies are followed and enforced. 
 
(e) Act as the Navy High Assurance (Class 4) PKI Certificate Approving 
Authority.  Communications Security (COMSEC) Material Issuing Office (CMIO) 
Norfolk provides a Navy Centralized CAW Facility (NCCF) to support DMS for other 
than Organizational Messaging and non-DMS FORTEZZA® requirements. 
 
(f) Act as Navy Registration Authority for Medium Assurance (Class 3) PKI. 
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(13) Navy Component Task Force – Computer Network Defense (NCTF-CND) 
shall: 
 
(a) Coordinate the defense of Navy computer networks and systems as 
directed by the Commander, Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense (JTF-
CND). 
 
(b) Defend computer networks and systems within the Navy’s elements of the 
Defense Information Infrastructure, as directed by the JTF-CND. 
 
(c) When tasked, be responsible for the monitoring, restoral, and security of 
Navy networks. 
 
(d) Monitor the Navy’s Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) 
compliance and act as the Navy’s Reporting Agent for IAVA. 
 
(e) Coordinate/direct appropriate actions to ensure Navy web pages resident 
on the World Wide Web are in compliance with prescribed Department of Defense and 
Navy guidance. 
 
(f) Make Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) recommendations to 
the Navy Command Center in response to a Computer Network Attack and report the 
Navy INFOCON status. 
 
(14) Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) shall provide law enforcement 
and counter-intelligence support to the NCTF-CND and FIWC. 
 
b.  Individual Responsibilities 
 
(1) Fleet Commanders-in-Chief and Second Echelon Commanders are responsible 
for implementation of the Navy IA Program within their respective claimancies and areas 
of responsibility and shall: 
 
(a) Appoint in writing an Information Assurance Officer to oversee and 
provide IA guidance to subordinate organizations. 
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(b) Appoint in writing an Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM) to 
oversee and implement the IA program within the claimancy.  This may be, but need not 
be the same individual assigned as Information Assurance Officer. 
 
(c) Provide oversight and management of the activity IA training program in 
accordance with all policies stated and referred to by this instruction, to include the Navy 
IA Publication Library. 
 
(d) Request vulnerability assessment assistance and Red and Blue Team 
operations from FIWC to validate IA controls and practices. 
 
(2) Commanding officers, commanders, and officers-incharge are responsible for 
the overall management of IA at the command level and shall: 
 
(a) Ensure all automated information systems or networks used by the 
command are individually and collectively accredited by the site DAA, or by the 
appropriate DAA in the case of information system services centrally procured or 
provided by another command. 
 
(b) Ensure that all of the requisite safeguards, as documented in the respective 
System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA), are implemented and that the site 
maintains accreditation.  Assess the need to reaccredit with each system configuration 
change.  While it is expected that the commander will be assisted in this effort by a 
certification agent, ISSM or Information System Security Officer (ISSO), accreditation is 
considered a command responsibility. 
 
(c) Appoint, in writing, an ISSM.  Where management and administrative 
functions have been consolidated within a Navy organization, the higher-level 
organization head may designate a single ISSM to manage IA for the entire organization, 
and subordinate ISSMs need not be appointed. 
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(d) Ensure that an ISSO is designated, as appropriate, for each information 
system and network in the organization, responsible for implementing and maintaining 
the site's information system and network security requirements.  For smaller commands, 
the same individual may perform ISSM and ISSO duties. 
 
(e) Ensure current standard operating procedures; inclusive of IA practices 
and procedures, are available and used for all information technology resources. 
 
(f) Ensure IA awareness indoctrination and annual IA refresher training are 
conducted down to the user level, tailored to specific site requirements. 
 
(g) Ensure all personnel performing IA functions receive initial basic and 
system specific training, required certification, as well as annual recurring, refresher, or 
follow-on training. 
 
(h) Ensure any computer intrusion incident, or suspicion of one, is reported to 
FIWC at navcirt@fiwc.navy.mil or 1-888-NAVCIRT, as required by reference (i). 
 
(3) Designated Approving Authority (DAA).  General guidance on DAA roles 
and responsibilities is available in ref (h).  Whether fulfilling the duties as DAA for 
program or systems development or as a site DAA, all DAAs shall: 
 
(a) Ensure sites and systems under their cognizance are accredited in 
accordance with the DITSCAP (reference (f)).  In doing so they shall review certification 
documentation to evaluate and determine an acceptable level of risk for information 
systems and for overall site configuration, to include the aggregate of information 
technology resources employed in a given geographic locale.   
 
(b) Ensure accredited sites and systems maintain the approved security posture 
throughout the life cycle. 
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(c) Ensure the respective SSAA delineates the applicable IA training 
requirements for users, operators, maintainers, administrators, and managers in 
accordance with this instruction and all specified references.  Site DAAs shall ensure the 
training requirements delineated in the SSAA are met and that training requirements for 
specific roles (e.g., DAA, ISSM, ISSO) are met prior to appointment. 
 
(d) Coordinate any requirements for delegation of DAA authority with CNO 
(N643). 
 
10.  Action.  All action addressees shall implement the guidance contained herein and all 
associated references to include the Navy IA Publication Library.  All developing and 
operating activities shall budget for, fund and execute the actions necessary to comply 
with this instruction and the publications that support it. 
 
 
R.  W.  MAYO 
Rear Admiral, U.S.  Navy 
Director, 
Space, Information Warfare, 
Command and Control (N6) 
 
Distribution: 
SNDL Parts 1 and 2 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
 
AIS:   Automated Information System 
ASN:   Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
C&A:   Certification and Accreditation 
CIO:   Chief Information Officer 
COMSEC:  Communications Security 
COR:   Central Office of Record 
DAA:   Designated Approving Authority 
DASN:  Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
DCMS:  Director, COMSEC Material System 
DIA:   Defense Intelligence Agency 
DII:   Defense Information Infrastructure 
DITSCAP:  Defense Information Technology Security C&A Program 
DoD:   Department of Defense 
DoN:   Department of the Navy 
FIWC:   Fleet Information Warfare Center 
FLTCINC:  Fleet Commander-in-Chief 
GENSER:  General Services 
IA:   Information Assurance 
IAAV:   Information Assurance and Assist Visit 
INFOSEC:  Information Systems Security 
ISSM:   Information Systems Security Manager 
ISSO:   Information Systems Security Officer 
NAVCIRT:  Naval Computer Incident Response Team 
NIPRNET:  Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network 
NISPOM:  National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual 
NOC:   Network Operations Center 
OLS:   On-line Survey 
ONI:   Office of Naval Intelligence 
PKI:   Public Key Infrastructure 
RD&A:  Research, Development and Acquisition 
SABI:   Secret and Below Interoperability 
SBU:   Sensitive but Unclassified 
SCE:   Service Cryptologic Element 
SCI:   Sensitive Compartmented Information 
SIOP:   Single Integrated Operations Plan 
SIPRNET:  Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
SISSM:  Senior Information Systems Security Manager 
SPAWAR:  Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
SSAA:   System Security Authorization Agreement 
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APPENDIX B.  INFORMATION ASSURANCE RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROCESS (HERNANDEZ P. 41-47) 
 
E. IARM PROCESS 
The IARM process is a simple five-step process.  It is a continuous process 
designed to detect, assess, and control risk to information while qualitatively enhancing 
computer network defense (CND) performance and maximizing network capabilities.  It 
is adapted from the concept of applying a standard, systematic approach to minimizing 
risk that was originally developed to improve safety in the development of weapons, 
aircraft, space vehicles, and nuclear power and is used throughout the Navy in 
Operational Risk Management (ORM).  The five steps are: 
 
1. Identify Vulnerabilities 
 Identify potential causes of compromise to information in terms of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  Specific actions include identifying computer 
network assets and listing vulnerabilities in terms of its effects on security services.  
Assets can include hardware, software, data, services, people, documentation, policies 
and supplies.  (Pfleeger, p. 464)  A table, as shown in Table 3-1 [Table A-1], can be used 
to organize the association of vulnerabilities and assets. 
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 ASSET CONFIDENTIALITY INTEGRITY AVAILABILITY 
Hardware    
Software    
Data    
Services    
People    
Policies    
Documentation    
 
Table B-1.  “Assets and Security Services (After Pfleeger)” (From: Hernandez p. 42) 
 
2. Asses Vulnerabilities 
 For each vulnerability identified, determine the associated risk in terms of 
severity and probability.  Specific actions include assessing the exposure, severity and 
probablility to the vulnerabilities listed in step 1.  The Risk Assessment Code (RAC) 
chart in figure 3-3 [Figure A-1] can be used to accomplish this step. 
92 
 Figure B-1.  “IARM Risk Assessment Code Chart (After U.S. Navy & Marine Corps 
School of Aviation Safety ORM Presentation)” (From: Hernandez p. 43) 
 
 Using this matrix does not lessen the inherently subjective nature of risk 
assessment, however a matrix does afford a consistent framework for evaluating risk.  
Although different matrices may be used for various applications, any risk assessment 
tool should include the elements of vulnerability severity and threat probability.  The 
RAC defined by a matrix represents the degree of risk associated with a vulnerability 
considering severity and probability.  While the degree of risk is subjective in nature, the 
RAC does accurately reflect the relative amount of risk perceived between various 
vulnerabilities.  Using the matrix, the RAC is derived as follows: 
 a.  Vulnerability Severity – An assessment of the worst credible 
consequences that can occur as a result of a vulnerability.  Severity is defined by a 
potential degree of information compromise, or loss of information all together (e.g. 
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denial of service).  The combination of the two or more vulnerabilities may increase the 
overall risk.  Vulnerability categories are assigned as Roman numerals according to the 
following criteria: 
  (1) Category I – The vulnerability may cause catastrophic loss of 
information or grave damage to national interests.  
  (2) Category II – The vulnerability may cause severe loss of 
information, severe damage to national or service interests, or severe degradation to the 
efficient use of information. 
  (3) Category III – The vulnerability may cause minor loss of 
information, minor damage to national, service or command interests, or minor 
degradation to efficient use of information. 
  (4) Category IV – The vulnerability may cause a minimal loss of 
information, minimal damage to national or service interests, or minimal degradation to 
efficient use of information. 
 b.  Exploitation probability – the probability that a vulnerability will result 
in an actual exploitation (some degree of compromise of data or denial of service), based 
on an assessment of such factors as location, exposure, affected population, experience, 
or previously established statistical information.  Exploitation probability will be 
assigned an English letter according to the following criteria: 
  (1) Sub-category A – Likely to occur immediately or within a short 
period of tme.  Expected to occur frequently to a computer network, servers, host or 
client. 
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  (2) Sub-category B – Probably will occur in time.  Expected to 
occur several times to a computer network, server, host or client. 
  (3) Sub-category C – May occur in time.  Can reasonably be 
expected to occur sometime to a computer network, server, host or client. 
  (4) Sub-category D – Unlikely to occur. 
 c.  Risk Assessment Code – The RAC is an expression of risk that 
combines the elements of vulnerability severity and exploitation probability.  The RAC is 
expressed as a single Arabic numeral that can be used to help determine vulnerability 
control priorities.  Note that in some cases, the worst credible consequence of a 
vulnerability may not correspond to the highest RAC for that vulnerability.  For example, 
one vulnerability may have two potential consequences (loss of confidentiality – I and 
non-repudiation – III).  The severity of the worst consequence (loss of confidentiality) 
may be unlikely (D), resulting in RAC 3.  The severity of the lesser consequence (III) 
may be likely (A), resulting in a RAC of 2.  Therefore, it is also important to consider 
less severe consequences of a vulnerability if it is more likely than the worst credible 
consequence, since the combination may present the greater overall risk.  (OPNAVINST 
3500.39, p. 7) 
 
3. Make Risk Decisions 
 Develop risk control options, and then decide if benefits outweigh risks.  
Start with the most serious risk first.  Specific Actions include identifying control 
options, determining the effects of those controls, prioritizing risk control measures, 
selecting risk controls and making risk decisions.  If risks outweigh benefit, or if 
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assistance is required to implement controls, seek further controls or guidance from 
superiors. 
4. Implement Controls 
 Once the risk decisions are made, implement selected controls.  Specific 
actions include making implementation of the above controls clear, establishing 
accountability, and providing support.  If the control entails a new IT technology like 
implementing a Virtual Private Network (VPN) for network traffic confidentiality, then it 
is vital that an investment be made into the people who will maintain and use it as well.  
A grouping of controls can be as follows: 
 a. Controls that implement confidentiality, integrity, authentication and 
non-repudiation: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), secure protocols (IPSec), secure e-mail 
(PGP), network integrity controls (intrusion detection systems), operating system 
protection features (anti-virus software), Secure Shell (SSH), etc.  These controls are 
most applicable to implementations at the application level 
  b. Controls that implement availability and access controls: network 
access controls (firewalls), secure socket layer (SSL), identification, database and 
operating system access controls, etc.  These controls are most applicable to 
implementations at the transport and network levels. 
 c.  Controls that protect the physical medium of transmission: link 
cryptography, spread-spectrum (low probability of detection and interception techniques 





Some methods of testing must be devised to ensure that the selected controls are 
performing as needed.  A well-designed vulnerability assessment can satisfy this need.  
Care must be taken to watch for changes that could impact the original assumptions of 
the risk assessment.  A change of this nature usually warrants initiating the IARM 
process again.  Other specific actions include supervising the control implementation, 
continuously monitoring for effectiveness, and collecting feedback from non-involved IT 
support personnel and users.  A summary of specific actions associated with each step of 
the IARM process is given below in figure 3-4 [Figure A-2]. 
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Figure B-2.  “The Cyclic IARM Process (After U.S. Air Force ORM Process)”  (From: 
Hernandez p. 47) 
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APPENDIX C. PROPOSED INFORMATION ASSURANCE RISK 
MANAGEMENT (IARM) CURRICULA (HERNANDEZ, P. 69-75) 
 
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has many areas of academic excellence 
that can be brought together to promote IA in the DON.  The Center for Information 
Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR) is already an acknowledged center of 
excellence in the field of computer security.  The Center for Executive Education (CEE) 
holds Flag-level seminars on revolutionary business practices and enjoys an excellent 
reputation among the senior leadership of the Navy.  The Information Warfare systems 
engineering curriculum is active in developing different taxonomies of Information 
Operations (IO).  IA can most benefit from a multi-disciplinary approach that includes 
computer science, information technology management, organizational behavior and 
Information Operations. These areas can be combined into an “Institute for Information 
Security (IIS).”    This center can study how information has become the center of gravity 
for many functions in today’s world and the future.  From business commerce to military 
operations, information, and its unhampered distribution, is seen as the key competitive 
edge needed to gain the advantage in many confrontational and competitive situations.  
How that information is managed, protected and distributed can be the focus of such a 
center.  Also, similar to the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps School of Aviation Safety 
and the Naval Safety Center and their positions as the standard-bearers, developers and 
promoters of ORM throughout the Fleet, the IIS can easily assume the same position vis-
à-vis IARM. 
One of the key reasons ORM has been adopted throughout the Fleet is because 
senior decision makers have been convinced of its applicability and utility in preventing 
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mishaps.  With its established credibility and reputation, NPS can have tremendous 
influence over those same decision makers DOD wide.  NPS can leverage this advantage 
by offering a weeklong, executive level course to senior decision makers (O-5 and above, 
and GS equivalent) in information assurance and its importance to the DON mission.  
This course would introduce the basics of information assurance and the critical role 
decision makers play in managing the risks associated with our computer networks.  It 
would have at its core the IAMR process.   This course could use the same philosophical 
approach as the Aviation Safety School’s six-day Aviation Safety Commander (ASC) 
course offered to unit Commanding Officers, Officers-in-Charge, and Safety Officers of 
major commands.  An NPS executive level course can be instrumental in raising 
awareness of network security and IA issues and the concepts of IARM given our 
increased reliance on computer networks and the information it carries.  It may also 
facilitate meeting Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) requirements to improve 
the security capabilities of our nation’s cyber-based critical infrastructure, and thus be 
applicable DOD wide. 
ORM enjoys widespread implementation throughout the Fleet because each unit 
has a safety function that is well trained, and can facilitate its practical application at the 
unit level.  To promote the practical implementation of IARM throughout the Fleet, the 
IIS can also offer a more in-depth course for senior IT support personnel and those 
individuals assigned with network security duties.  This course could emulate the 
approach that the Aviation Safety School uses with its 28 instructional-day course for 
unit Aviation Safety Officers.  This IT support personnel/information systems security 
officer (ISSO) course can be tailored to focus on officer IT specialist and enlisted IT 
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support corps.  This advanced course can be divided into the following areas, much like 
the SANS Institute uses during its conferences: 
- Fundamentals of Information Assurance 
- Firewalls and Perimeter Protection 
- Intrusion Detection Systems 
- Incident Handling 
- Current High-Threat Vulnerabilities and Cracker Exploits 
- Effective Audit and Vulnerability Assessments 
- IARM 
The above two courses can be offered in cooperation with other DOD, 
government, academic or civilian institutions (e.g. SANS Institute, Carnegie Mellon, 
National Security Agency (NSA), Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC), etc.) and 
tailored to the needs of the participants if warranted.  Classified portions of the above 
courses can also be offered as NPS has the required facilities to do this, and would make 
the executive level course more worthwhile for busy senior decision makers. 
It is recognized that there are other entities endeavoring to accomplish these ends, 
but a more coordinated effort will gain efficiencies where none exist now.  NPS is 
uniquely positioned to straddle the boundaries between the military, government, 
academia, and industry to realize these efficiencies.  The NPS IIS can ultimately serve as 
the center for DON’s efforts to improve IA throughout the Fleet and possibly throughout 
the Federal Government. 
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The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) can test some of the concepts above by 
first introducing them into the Information Systems and Operations (ISO) curriculum.  
The purpose of the ISO curriculum is to “develop a cadre of Unrestricted Line (URL) 
Officers with the expertise to innovatively create concepts of war fighting and the 
application of information technology (IT) to implement them operationally.”  This cadre 
would benefit greatly form a thorough understanding of being able to apply the principles 
of ORM to IA (i.e., IARM) because they are the ones expected to facilitate the integration 
of IT into all the Navy does operationally. 
The following is offered as a possible outline of IA curricula that can be applied 
to four targets groups: Line Officers, IT officer corps, enlisted IT support corps, and 
general users, and emulates closely the approach taken to implement ORM throughout 
the fleet.  The note slides in appendix B is offered as the basis for an indoctrination 
presentation for IARM.  [Appendix B and the note slides referred to were not included in 
this thesis.  See Appendix B of LCDR Hernadez’s thesis.] 
 
A. INDOCTRINATION TRAINING OUTLINE 
Audience: All Users 
The purpose of this curriculum is to provide a basic understanding of what IA is, 
what risk management is, the benefits derived from it, the concepts that apply to it, and 
how to do time critical IARM.  Content: 
• IARM terms and definitions 
• IARM introduction concept 
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• Four principles of IARM 
• IARM vs. traditional approach 
• Benefits of IARM 
• Three levels of IARM 
• Time critical IARM, examples and demonstration 
• Specific applications (demonstrating applicability to existing IA processes and 
procedures) 
Appendix B is offered as a possible presentation for this course.  [Appendix B 
referred to was not included in this thesis.  See Appendix B of LCDR Hernadez’s thesis.] 
 
B. USER OUTLINE 
Audience: Junior IT Support Personnel 
This curriculum is applicable to all users who use IT as a vital portion of their 
everyday duties, and the more junior members of the IT support corps referred to below, 
with the purpose of expanding their understanding of IA and the deliberate five-step 
process of IARM.  Content: Indoctrination Training plus: 
• Fundamentals of Information Assurance (IA) 
• Deliberate IARM process and demonstration 
• Basic vulnerability identification, tools, examples 
• Vulnerability assessment tools and examples 
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• Risk assessment tools and examples 
• Deliberate IARM practical exercise 
• Specific applications (demonstrating applicability to existing IA processes and 
procedures) 
 
C. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT CORPS OUTLINE 
Audience: Experienced IT Support Personnel and System Administrators 
This curriculum is applicable to those more senior who actually maintain, support 
and administrate information systems within their commands with the purpose of 
expanding their understanding of current threats and vulnerabilities, and provide the tools 
necessary for implementing IARM in their command.  Content:  Users Curriculum plus: 
• Advanced Information Assurance 
• Firewalls and Perimeter Protection 
• Intrusion Detection Systems 
• Incident Handling 
• Current High-Threat Vulnerabilities and Cracker Exploits 
• Basics of effective Audit and Vulnerability Assessment 
• In-depth vulnerability identification tools and examples 
• Risk assessment tools and examples (cross section of available tools) 
• Command implementation and leadership concepts 
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• Specific applications (demonstrating applicability to existing IA processes and 
procedures) 
  
D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) OFFICER CORPS OUTLINE 
Audience: IT Officer Specialist 
This curriculum is applicable to those officers who are the enablers of the 
integration of IT into the everyday activities that are performed in the DON with the 
purpose to give enough knowledge to understand in-depth and deliberate IARM, what 
IARM can provide, and how to implement it within their units.  Contents: IT Support 
Corps curriculum plus: 
• Introduction to Information Operations (IO)/Information Warfare (IW) 
• Advanced studies on the current threats and vulnerabilities 
• Specific Applications 
 
E. SENIOR LEADERSHIP OUTLINE 
Audience: O-5 and Above (GS equivalent) 
This curriculum is applicable to the senior leadership in the DON who will make 
IARM implementation effective through control of the rewards system used in the DON, 
with the purpose to provide a basic understanding of the IARM process, the benefits 
derived from it, the three levels and some of the applications of IARM.  Content: 
• IA background 
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• Current threats and recent exploitations (classified if necessary) 
• Three levels of IARM 
• Five step process of IARM 
• IARM vs. traditional approach 
• Specific fleet applications 
• Benefits of IARM 
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APPENDIX D. OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT (ORM) 
OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3500.39A  
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OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3500.39A 
MARINE CORPS ORDER 3500.27A 
 
From: Chief of Naval Operations 
Commandant of the Marine Corps 
To: All Ships and Stations 
 
Subj: OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT (ORM) 
 
Ref: (a) DODINST 6055.1 (NOTAL) 
 
Encl: (1) Introduction to Operational Risk Management 
 
1.  Purpose.  To establish ORM, in accordance with reference (a), as an integral part of 
naval operations, training and planning at all levels in order to optimize operational 
capability, readiness, and enhance mission accomplishment. 
 
2.  Cancellation.  OPNAVINST 3500.39 and MCO 3500.27. 
 
3.  Background 
 
     a.  Uncertainty and risk are inherent in the nature of military action.  The success of 
the Naval Services is based upon a willingness to balance risk with opportunity in taking 
the bold and decisive action necessary to triumph in battle.  At the same time, 
commanders have a fundamental responsibility to safeguard highly valued personnel and 
material resources, and to accept only the minimal level of risk necessary to accomplish 
an assigned mission.   
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     b.  ORM is an effective process for maintaining readiness in peacetime and achieving 
success in combat without infringing upon the prerogatives of the commander.  
Historically, the greater percentage of losses during combat operations was due to  
OPNAVINST 3500.39A 
MCO 3500.27A 
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mishaps.  Unnecessary losses either in battle or during training are detrimental to 
operational capability.  Since 1991, ORM, applied both in day-to-day operations and 
during crisis periods, has produced dramatic results in reducing these losses.  This 
instruction supports the guidance provided in reference (a) to integrate this effective 
technique throughout the Department of Defense.  It provides a means to help define risk 
and control it where possible, thereby assisting the commander in choosing the best 
course of action and seizing the opportunities which lead to victory. 
 
     c.  All naval missions, as well as daily routines, involve risk.  Every operation, both on 
and off-duty, requires some degree of decision making that includes risk assessment and 
risk management.  The naval vision is to develop an environment where every leader, 
Sailor, Marine and civilian is trained and motivated to personally manage risk in 
everything they do, both in peacetime and during conflict, thus successfully completing 
all operations with minimum risk. 
 
3.  Scope.  This instruction applies to all Navy and Marine Corps activities, commands 
and personnel.  Addressees should, as appropriate, issue an implementing instruction to 
augment this policy, including command-specific applications and requirements. 
 
4.  Discussion.  ORM is a decision making process that enhances operational capability.  
Naval Warfare Publication 1 states, "Risk management and risk assessment are formal, 
essential tools of operational planning.  Sound decision making requires the use of these 
tools both in battle and in training." ORM, described in enclosure (1), is a method for 
identifying hazards, assessing risks and implementing controls to reduce the risk 
associated with any operation.  Implementation of ORM in the Department of the Navy 
will be accomplished as follows: 
 
     a.  ORM will be included in the orientation and training of all military personnel.  
Level of training will be commensurate with rank, experience and leadership position. 
 
          (1) ORM training shall be incorporated into leadership courses, General Military 
Training and courses where operational employment, safety, or force protection are 
addressed (e.g., safety schools, initial warfare qualification schools, and tactical or 
operational level war fighting courses).  ORM training shall be incorporated into existing 
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          (2) The ORM process and its specific application to pertinent subjects shall be 
integrated into fleet tactical training, Personnel Qualification Standards(PQS), Naval and 
Occupational Standards, Individual Training Standards and the Marine Corps Combat 
Readiness Evaluation System. 
 
     b.  ORM lessons learned will be submitted to Chief of Naval Operations (N09K) 
and/or Commandant of the Marine Corps (SD) for inclusion in ORM data bases. 
 
     c.  The ORM process shall be integrated into all levels of a command. 
 
          (1) Hazards shall be identified, risks assessed, and controls developed and 
implemented during the earliest possible planning stages.  Operations shall be 
continuously monitored for effectiveness of controls and situational changes. 
 
          (2) Information available through existing safety, training and lessons learned data 
bases will be considered whenever practicable in making risk decisions. 
 
 5.  Action.  All Navy and Marine Corps activities shall apply the principles of ORM in 
planning, operations and training.  The ORM process shall be applied to optimize 
operational capability and readiness.  ORM decisions are made by the leader directly 
responsible for the mission.  Prudence, experience, judgement, intuition and situational 
awareness are critical elements in making effective risk management decisions.  When 
the leader responsible for executing the mission determines that the risk associated with 
that mission cannot be controlled at his/her level, or goes beyond the commander’s stated 
intent, he/she shall elevate the decision to his/her chain of command. 
 
     a.  Chief of Naval Operations (N09K) and Commandant of the Marine Corps (SD) 
shall provide policy sponsorship and service approval of Navy and Marine Corps ORM. 
 
     b.  Chief of Naval Operations resource sponsors shall integrate ORM into existing 
training topics during review of courses under their cognizance. 
 
     c.  Chief of Naval Operations (N09K) and Commandant of the Marine Corps (SD) 
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     d.  Navy Warfare Development Command shall address ORM concepts and 
applications in appropriate doctrinal publications. 
 
     e.  Systems Commands shall provide information, data and technical support for the 
resolution of hazards under their cognizance. 
 
     f.  Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) shall: 
 
          (1) Develop curricula for and incorporate appropriate ORM instructions at each 
level of formal leadership training, General Military Training (GMT) and all courses 
where safety or force protection is or should be appropriately addressed. 
 
          (2) Integrate specific applications of the Operational Risk Management process 
into PQS. 
 
     g.  Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Center shall: 
 
         (1) Develop curricula for and incorporate appropriate ORM instructions at each 
level of formal leadership training, GMT and all courses where safety or force protection 
is or should be appropriately addressed. 
 
         (2) Integrate specific applications of the Operational Risk Management process into 
Individual Training Standards and the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation 
System. 
 
          (3) Address ORM concepts and applications in appropriate doctrinal publications. 
 
     h.  Commander, Naval Safety Center shall provide on request ORM excerpts from 
mishap and hazard reports and analysis of loss data. 
 
     i.  Naval Manpower Analysis Center shall incorporate the ORM process into Naval 
Standards and, where specific applications warrant additional requirements, Occupational 
Standards. 
 
     j.  Fleet Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and Commanders, Marine Forces 
(COMMARFORs) shall provide resources necessary to implement Operation Risk 
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k.  Fleet, Type and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commanders shall: 
 
          (1) Incorporate the ORM process into operations, exercises and training. 
 
(2) Address the ORM process in post exercise/operation reports. 
 
l.  Unit Commanders shall: 
 
(1) Implement the ORM process within their commands. 
Examples include, but are not limited to: 
 
(a) Providing training to Command personnel on enclosure (1). 
 
(b) Incorporating identified hazards, risk assessments and controls into briefs, 
notices and written plans. 
 
(c) Conducting a thorough risk assessment for all new or complex evolutions, 
defining acceptable risk and possible contingencies for the evolution. 
 
(2) Address the ORM process in safety, training and lessons learned reports.  
Reports should comment on hazards, risk assessments and effectiveness of controls 
implemented. 
 
(3) Inform the chain of command as to what hazards cannot be controlled or 
mitigated at their command level. 
 
 
V. E. CLARK     J. L. JONES, JR. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
1. Assurance 
Grounds for confidence that a system design meets its requirements, or that its 
implemented satisfies specifications, or that some specific property is satisfied (CIAO 
185). 
2. Duty  
A major part of a job; a group of closely related tasks.  A collection of duties 
makes up a job.  A duty must be observable and measurable, occupies a major part of the 
work time, and occurs often in the work cycle  (NAVEDTRA 130A p. 3-1-2). 
3. Information Assurance (IA) 
Information operations that protect and defend information and information 
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by 
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities (CIAO 188). 
4. Information Assurance Risk Management (IARM) 
The process of dealing with risk to information and data that is inherently 
associated with information operations and information systems, which includes risk 
assessment, risk decision-making, and implementation of effective risk controls 
(Hernandez 37). 
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5. Information Security 
Actions taken for the purpose of reducing system risk, specifically, reducing the 
probability that a threat will succeed in exploiting critical infrastructure vulnerabilities 
using electronic, RF, or computer-based means (CIAO 188). 
6. Information Systems (IS) 
The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components for the 
collection, processing, storage, transmission, display, dissemination, and disposition of 
information (CIAO 188). 
7. Information System Security  
The protection of ISs [information systems] against unauthorized access to or 
modification of information, whether in storage, processing or transit, and against the 
denial of service to authorized users or the provision of service to unauthorized users, 
including those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats.  IS 
security includes consideration of all hardware and/or software functions, characteristics, 
and/or features; operational procedures, accountability procedures, and access controls at 
the central computer facility, remote computer, and terminal facilities; management 
constraints; physical structures and devices; and personnel and communications controls 
needed to provide an acceptable level of risk for the IS and for the data and information 
contained in the IS (Naval Information 56). 
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 8. Information System Security Manager (ISSM)  
Person responsible to the activity's DAA who develops, maintains, and directs the 
implementation of the INFOSEC program within the activity. The ISSM advises the CO 
on all INFOSEC matters, including identifying the need for additional INFOSEC staff. 
Serves as the Command's point of contact for all INFOSEC matters and implements the 
command's INFOSEC program.  Previously the ADP Security Officer (Naval 
Information 56). 
9. Information System Security Officer (ISSO) 
Person responsible for ensuring that security is provided for and implemented 
throughout the life cycle of an information resource. Responsible for implementing 
system specific security policies in the operational environment. ISSO's are typically 
responsible for single-user computers (e.g., personal computers and workstations), multi-
user computers or departmental Local Area Networks (LANs). The ISSO assists the 
ISSM in implementing the command's INFOSEC program for an assigned system or area 
of control. Previously the ADP Systems Security Officer (Naval Information 56). 
10. Information Technology 
The hardware and software that processes information, regardless of the 
technology involved, whether computers, telecommunications, or others (CIAO 188). 
11. Job 
Made up of duties and tasks (NAVEDTRA 130A p. 3-1-2) 
115
 12. Network 
Information system implemented with a collection of interconnected nodes. 
(CIAO 189). 
13. Probability 
The likelihood that a vulnerability will result in data loss or compromise based on 
factors such as physical location, network services provided, network protocols, 
operating systems, personnel, and historical information.  An expression of the possibility 
of a successful exploitation (Hernandez 36). 
14. Risk 
The probability that a particular critical infrastructure’s vulnerability being 
exploited by a particular threat weighted by the impact of that exploitation (CIAO 190). 
15. Risk Assessment 
Produced from the combination of Threat and Vulnerability Assessments. 
Characterized by analyzing the probability of destruction or incapacitation resulting from 
a threat’s exploitation of a critical infrastructure’s vulnerabilities (CIAO 190). 
16. Risk Management 
Deliberate process of understanding risk and deciding upon and implementing 
actions to reduce risk to a defined level.  Characterized by identifying, measuring, and 
controlling risks to a level commensurate with an assigned value (CIAO 190). 
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 17. Severity 
The worst, credible consequence that can occur as a result of a vulnerability.  It is 
the potential degree of data or information loss or compromise (Hernandez 35). 
18. Task  
A major part of a duty; clusters of tasks make up a duty.  A task must be 
observable and measurable and performed in a relatively short period of time.  Each task 
is an independent part of the job, and is independent of other tasks (NAVEDTRA 130A 
p. 3-1-3). 
19. Vulnerability 
A characteristic of a critical infrastructure’s design, implementation, or operation 
of that renders it susceptible to destruction or incapacitation by a threat (CIAO 191). 
20. Vulnerability Assessment 
Systematic examination of a critical infrastructure, the interconnected systems on 
which it relies, its information, or product to determine the adequacy of security 
measures, identify security deficiencies, evaluate security alternatives, and verify the 
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